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RETALIATORY LITIGATION TACTICS:

The

Chilling Effects of "After-Acquired
Evidence"
Melissa Hartt
Even a victim of the most egregious discrimination may recover little
monetary relief ifthe defendant discovers, after firing the employee, that
she committed some firable offense. Yet the case in which the Supreme
Court so held, McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., was widely
viewed as a victory rather than a defeat for plaintiffs. This surprising
perception flowed from the Court's holding that such "after-acquired
evidence" of misconduct merely limited remedies but did not completely
eliminate plaintiffs' rights to sue for discrimination. Given that McKennon
could be portrayed either as a victory for plaintiffs or an unjust denial of
relief for plaintiffs, it is surprising that there has been little academic
inquiry into the actual effects of McKennon on discriminationclaims.
This Article documents how the after-acquired evidence doctrine of
McKennon plays a troubling role in civil rights litigation:It shifts the focus
of the discussion off the employer 's illegal acts and onto the worthiness of
the plaintiffand it chills full enforcement of discriminationlaws. Using both
an empirical analysis ofjudicial decisions and a series of interviews with
attorneys, this Article uncovers new evidence that employers most often
seek to limit a plaintiff's remedies based on evidence of relatively minor
transgressions, most commonly resume fraud, that would not likely have
been discovered had the plaintiff not sued to challenge employment
discrimination. Further, both the data from judicial opinions and the
evidence from practicingattorneys suggest that the potentialfor disclosure
of negativepersonal and professional information dissuadesplaintiffs from
pursuing even meritorious claims of discrimination.
From its inception, the after-acquired evidence defense has prompted
concern from a small number of critical voices that it carriedpotentialas a
t
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tool for abuse of employees seeking to vindicate their rights. The evidence
offered in this Article substantiates these concerns, which raise serious
doubts about the continued existence of the doctrine. Acknowledging how
unlikely the defense is to be abolished, this Article concludes that these
concerns should alternatively prompt litigants and courts to recognize
claims of illegal retaliation when employers misuse the after-acquired
evidence doctrine by asserting the defense frivolously to deter plaintiffs
from pursuingdiscriminationclaims.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Even a victim of the most egregious discrimination may recover little
monetary relief if the defendant discovers, after illegally firing the
employee, that she had once committed some firable offense. The Supreme
Court reached that conclusion unanimously in McKennon v. Nashville
Banner Publishing Co.1 in 1995, and the "after-acquired evidence" doctrine
has been used since to limit damages for victims of discrimination and to
justify wide-ranging discovery into plaintiffs' personal and professional
backgrounds. 2 As a result of the McKennon decision, a woman who suffered
years of egregious sexual harassment on the job could be denied substantial
recovery because her employer learned in the discovery process that her
application, filled out years earlier, had not disclosed that she had been fired
from her previous place of employment. Hispanic employees facing
rampant discrimination at a factory could face searching investigation into
their family and personal backgrounds as their employer seeks to establish
that they misrepresented their immigration status on employment forms.4
Older employees pushed out of jobs given to younger replacements may
end up debating the strictness of their company's personal computer use
restrictions rather than the negative social and personal consequences of age
discrimination.'
And yet McKennon was widely viewed as a victory for employment
discrimination plaintiffs because it did not destroy as many discrimination
claims as the rule it rejected.' Before the Court's decision, employers were
1.
513 U.S. 352 (1995).
2.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Rose Casual Dining, L.P., No. 02-7485, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4335 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2004); Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 647 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
3.
See Rose CasualDining, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4335, at *31-33.
4.
See Rivera, 204 F.R.D. at 651.
5.
See, e.g., Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp., CV-03-467-ST, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18863
(D. Or. Sept. 15, 2004).
6.
See, e.g., Robert F. Thompson III, McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.:
The Masquerading Doctor, The "Greatest Treason," and After-Acquired Evidence in
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successfully arguing that an employee was not entitled to any remedy under
Title VII if the employer could uncover some evidence, unknown at the
time of the adverse action, that would have provided a justification for the
decision.7 The Court rejected the notion that this type of after-acquired
justification for an adverse employment action could eliminate liability for
discrimination.' Instead, the Court concluded, this previously unknown
evidence of employee misconduct should not be excluded entirely, but
should be used only to limit the plaintiffs remedies.9 While there was no
dissent on the Court from this approach, a very small number of critical
commentators predicted that the doctrine as framed would discourage
meritorious cases and give employers incentives to conduct aggressive and
intrusive background investigations in response to discrimination claims.' °
As it turns out, those critics were correct.
This Article takes a closer look at after-acquired evidence and its
consequences. This assessment involves first an empirical analysis of all
available judicial decisions for the two decades from the first appearance of
the doctrine to year-end 2006.1 This analysis gives a clear picture of the
doctrine's impact at the stages of litigation that are captured in judicial
decisions. But so many disputes arise and are disposed of before any formal
opinion is ever issued that examining legal opinions can only tell part of the
story.12 The full effect of a legal doctrine can only be appreciated by
considering what role it plays in decisions made before a lawsuit ever
begins, and in the early-often dispositive-stages of formal litigation. 3
Thus, this Article goes beyond the limited body of judicial decisions to
incorporate interviews with practicing lawyers from around the country
Employment Discrimination Suits, 49 ARK. L. REV. 625, 630 (1996) (noting that in early
reaction to the decision, plaintiffs' groups saw it as a victory).
7. See id.
8.
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1995).
9.
Id. at 360-62.
10. See Robert Brookins, Policy Is the Lodestar When Two Wrongs Collide: AfterAcquired Evidence Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 72 N.D. L. REV. 197,
199-200 (1996); William R. Corbett, The "Fall"of Summers, the Rise of "Pretext Plus," and
the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment DiscriminationLaw to Employment at
Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305, 382 (1996) ("In short, the
Court's half-hearted attempt to address the 'not... insubstantial [concern]' regarding employer
exploitation of the Court's treatment of after-acquired evidence does not begin to address the
practical, day-to-day subordination of federal employment discrimination law.").
11. See infra Part II.
12. See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A
Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 1133, 1137 (1990) (describing results of a study of 4,310 cases, of which eighty
percent did not produce a published district court opinion).
13. See infra Part III.C.
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discussing how the doctrine affects the realities of discrimination litigation.
Based on both the empirical study and the interviews, this Article argues
that the after-acquired evidence defense chills civil rights litigation and
shifts the focus of these cases from the discriminatory conduct of the
defendant to the unrelated, often trivial misconduct of the plaintiff.14
From the moment the Supreme Court endorsed the doctrine in
McKennon, both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") and a few courts recognized the possibility that the defense
might be employed to coerce and intimidate employees. 5 In the years since
McKennon, however, the argument that a defendant's use of after-acquired
evidence might constitute illegal retaliatory action under federal law has
14. The doctrine and its implications are not unique to federal discrimination litigation.
The most hotly debated recent example of the doctrine in action is one that pits academic
freedom against academic misconduct. In 2005, a University of Colorado professor named
Ward Churchill made national headlines with an essay he had written referring to the victims of
the September 11, 2001 attacks as "Little Eichmanns." See Ward Churchill, "Some People Push
Back": On the Justice of Roosting Chickens, http://web.archive.org/web/200702
03133327/http://www.darknightpress.org/index.php?i=news&c=recent&view-9
(last visited
Feb. 23, 2008). The public outcry led to calls for his dismissal from the University. In response,
the University pointed to Churchill's status as a tenured professor and observed that academic
freedom protected him from dismissal based on his opinions. See Thomas Brown, Is Ward
Churchill the New Michael Bellesiles?, HNN, Mar. 14, 2005, http://www.hnn.us/
articles/10633.html. Fairly quickly, however, the sustained attention on Churchill uncovered
allegations of plagiarism and other academic misconduct. Id. The University established a
committee to review the allegations, and in 2006, the committee recommended to the University
administration that Churchill be disciplined for serious academic misconduct. See JOSEPH RosSE
ET AL.,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OF THE STANDING

COMMITTEE

ON RESEARCH

MISCONDUCT CONCERNING ALLEGATIONS OF RESEARCH MISCONDUCT BY PROFESSOR WARD
CHURCHILL 16 (2006), available at http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/download/
ChurchillStandingCmteReport.pdf. The review revealed that Churchill had likely engaged in
resume fraud, that he had exaggerated his military record, that he described himself as Native
American despite having no such ancestry, and, most significantly, that he had plagiarized and
engaged in other academic misconduct on several occasions. See Brown, supra; see also ROSSE
ET AL., supra, at 7. The President of the University ultimately recommended that Churchill be
dismissed and, in July 2007, the Regents of the University adopted that recommendation. See
Hank Brown, The Churchill Firing-I, INSIDE HIGHER ED, July 30, 2007,
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2007/07/30/brown. While the case is not a Title VII suit,
it raises precisely the same questions that the cases studied here present. Just as the
discrimination plaintiff is entitled to pursue litigation to vindicate her rights, Churchill was
entitled to express his views, however objectionable. The ensuing investigation, like
investigations undertaken after an employee has claimed discrimination, had an appearance of
improper motive. But there is no question that the misconduct the investigation uncovered was
real and serious. What should the consequences of that misconduct now be?
15. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1236-37 (3d Cir. 1994); Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Notice No. 915.002, Enforcement Guidance on
After-Acquired Evidence and McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. (1995), available
at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mckennon.html; see also infra Part IV.B.2.
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never gained any traction in the courts. The idea that an employer might use
the defense to punish a plaintiff for challenging discrimination, and that this
punitive conduct might violate the law, is in tension with the general notion
that litigants are entitled to make all available arguments as part of a right to
petition the courts for relief. But even conduct that is generally permissible
may violate the prohibition on retaliating against discrimination claimants if
it is undertaken for the purpose of deterring civil rights claims. 6 Thus, for
example, courts have permitted claims of illegal retaliation when defendants
assert counterclaims in response to the filing of a discrimination lawsuit. 7
The Supreme Court's 2006 liberalization of the standards for proving
retaliation--declaring unlawful any action tending to deter discrimination
complaints08 -has the potential to increase the number of successful claims
like these. It should also prompt litigants and courts to consider more
seriously the possibility of a challenge to retaliatory abuses of the afteracquired evidence defense.
Part II briefly introduces the after-acquired evidence doctrine as it was
framed by McKennon, and then examines how the doctrine has been applied
by the courts with an empirical analysis of the surprisingly sparse two
decades of case law (274 reported decisions). Part III considers some
possible explanations for the relatively small number of after-acquired
evidence cases and then explores how after-acquired evidence influences
the earliest stages of litigation-well before any judicial opinion would
record the progress of a case-by detailing the results of interviews with
practicing employment lawyers from several major cities. Part IV begins by
arguing that, in light of the evidence offered in both the interviews and the
empirical analysis, the after-acquired evidence doctrine should be abolished
and explaining why that is unlikely to happen. As an alternative to simply
eliminating the doctrine, Part IV suggests that courts should construe
retaliation law as a tool to prevent misuse of the doctrine.
II.

WHAT COURTS SAY ABOUT AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE

The after-acquired evidence doctrine became a matter of regular
litigation in employment discrimination disputes in the late 1980s, when
courts around the country began accepting defendants' arguments that a
plaintiff who had engaged in conduct that would have lost him the job even
absent discrimination had essentially not been discriminated against in the
16.
17.
18.

See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a) (2000).
See infra Part IV.B.2.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2417-18 (2006).
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eyes of the law. 9 These courts concluded that after-acquired evidence
would operate as a complete bar to liability.2 0 The doctrine thus framed was
a very powerful tool for defendants. As one lawyer put it at the time, "[I]t
was a goldmine or a godsend. All you have to do is take an employee and
find out something that they have done wrong, some misconduct
that you
21
claim.",
rights
civil
their
goes
there
boom,
and,
about
never knew
Defense lawyers pounced on the new defense, advising their clients on
policies and practices that would maximize the potential utility of the
doctrine. As one court noted, expressing reservations about endorsing the
defense:
[T]he efficacy of the after-acquired evidence tactic has not
escaped the attention of defense counsel, some of whom have
recommended that . . . counsel's first step . . . should be
thoroughly to investigate the plaintiffs background and job
performance. Indeed, many have instructed employers on specific
policies .... and, if recognized, one can anticipate the extensive
and effective use of the after-acquired evidence doctrine.22

Along these lines, lawyers advised their clients that "applications and
employee manuals [should] expressly state that resume fraud or application
misrepresentations will result in suspension pending discharge."2 3 Others
observed that "[m]anagement . . . should respond to this favorable
development by routinely searching for pre-employment misrepresentations
as a potential defense in all discharge litigation. Employers in turn should

maximize the probability that 'after-acquired' evidence is available as a
defense by revising employment applications to elicit even more specific

19. See, e.g., Rebecca Harmer White & Robert D. Brussack, The Proper Role of AfterAcquired Evidence in Employment DiscriminationLitigation, 35 B.C. L. REv. 49, 55-59 (1993);
Cheryl Krause Zemelman, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination
Claims: The Privatizationof Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 175, 178-80 (1993).

20. See Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708-09 (10th Cir.
1988).
21. Audio script file: All Things Considered, (National Public Radio broadcast Jan. 23,
1995) (available in LexisNexis Library, Script File) (transcript of Michael Terry, attorney for
Christine McKennon, relating a statement made by a management lawyer).
22. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1236 (3d Cir. 1994).
23. James A. Burstein & Steven L. Hamann, Better Late Than Never-After-Acquired
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases, 19 EMP. REL. L.J. 193, 202-03 (1993).
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information."24 And some counseled that employers "should leave no stone
unturned in ferreting out any evidence" of resume or application fraud.25
The Supreme Court's decision in MeKennon took some of the teeth out
of the defense by holding that it could not eliminate liability entirely.26 But
the Court endorsed the doctrine as a tool to significantly limit a
discrimination plaintiff's damages where it applies.27 The doctrine continues
to play an important role in employment discrimination litigation, yet one
that has gone largely unexamined. This Part will consider the current use of
the after-acquired evidence doctrine as it appears in judicial opinions. It will
begin with a brief description of the doctrine as developed in McKennon,
and will then explore the results of an empirical analysis of the lower
courts'
discussions of after-acquired
evidence in employment
discrimination cases over the past two decades.

A.

The Doctrine as Conceived: The McKennon Rule

The after-acquired evidence doctrine came to the Supreme Court after
simmering in the lower courts for about a decade.28 In that time, a deep
divide had developed between those courts that viewed the defense as an
absolute bar to liability and those that were concerned about permitting
discriminatory actions to go unsanctioned because of essentially unrelated
conduct by the plaintiff.29
The dispute arrived at the Court through the employment history of
Christine McKennon, a thirty-year employee of the Nashville Banner who
lost her job in a reduction in force at the newspaper.3" Ms. McKennon, who
was sixty-two years old at the time, believed that her dismissal was actually
motivated by her age and she filed suit, alleging a violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Acte3' ("ADEA"). During her deposition,
Ms. McKennon acknowledged that she had certain confidential company
24. George D. Mesritz, "After-Acquired" Evidence of Pre-Employment Representations:
An Effective Defense Against Wrongful DischargeClaims, 18 EMP. REL. L.J. 215, 215 (1992).
25. William S. Waldo & Rosemary A. Mahar, Lost Cause and Found Defense: Using
Evidence Discovered After an Employee's Discharge to Bar Discrimination Claims, 9 LAB.
LAW.

31, 32 (1993).

26. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1995).
27. Id. at 360-63.
28. See id. at 355-56.
29. See id. (describing circuit split). Compare Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
864 F.2d 700, 704-08 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that after-acquired evidence barred liability),
with Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1227-28 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that
after-acquired evidence did not bar liability).
30. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 354.
31. Id. at 354-55.

ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

documents in her possession.32 She had taken the documents, she explained,
when she became concerned that she was going to lose her job and decided
to copy company financial records for "insurance" and "protection."33
Immediately after learning of the improperly removed documents, Nashville
Banner's attorney sent Ms. McKennon a letter informing her that she had,
once again, been fired-this time for violating company policy.34 The
district court dismissed Ms. McKennon's claim of age discrimination,
concluding that the after-acquired evidence of misconduct that would have
been sufficient grounds for termination eliminated the defendant's liability
for age discrimination.35
As the case came to the Supreme Court, the defendant conceded age
discrimination.36 The only question before the Court was the effect on a
discrimination claim of after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing that would
have resulted in discharge in any event.37 A unanimous Court rejected the
rule that such evidence should operate as a bar to all forms of relief.38 The
Court observed that federal antidiscrimination law "reflects a societal
condemnation of invidious bias in employment decisions,"39 and that the
absolute bar did not accord with congressional desire to have private
litigants vindicate important statutory goals.4" The Court noted that the
statutes are structured both to prompt changes in the workplace and to
compensate for injuries already caused by prohibited discrimination.41 The
remedies available to private litigants are a central element of this
structure.42
32. Id. at 355.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.; see McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 608 (M.D.
Tenn. 1992). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. McKennon v. Nashville
Banner Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir. 1993).
36. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 355.
37. Id. at 356.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 357.
40. Id. at 358. Although McKennon was an ADEA case, courts have not paused in
applying the after-acquired evidence rule to cases under other federal statutes. See, e.g.,
Throneberry v. McGehee Desha County Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 980-81 (8th Cir. 2005) (Family
and Maternity Leave Act); Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017, 1021 (11 th Cir. 2001)
(Title VII race discrimination); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir. 1995)
(Title VII and Equal Pay Act).
41. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358.
42. Id.; see also id. at 362 ("An absolute rule barring any recovery of backpay, however,
would undermine the ADEA's objective of forcing employers to consider and examine their
motivations, and of penalizing them for employment decisions that spring from age
discrimination.").
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The error made by courts that had treated after-acquired evidence as
eliminating an employer's liability entirely was that they had considered the
' In doing so, lower
problem as though it were one of "mixed motives."43
courts had relied on a line of cases holding that, where an employer was
motivated by both a lawful and an unlawful reason in making its decision,
the employee could not prevail in litigation if the lawful reason would alone
have justified the decision.44 As the Court noted in McKennon, however, the
mixed-motive circumstance is fundamentally different from the one
presented by after-acquired evidence because, in a mixed motive case, the
legitimate reason actually did play some part in the defendant's decision.45
By contrast, evidence that was acquired only after the adverse action could
not have played any role in the decision.4 6 "The employer could not have
been motivated by knowledge it did not have and it cannot
now claim that
47
reason.,
nondiscriminatory
the
for
fired
was
employee
the
After rejecting an absolute bar to liability, the Court went on to say that
in determining the plaintiffs remedies, "[t]he employee's wrongdoing must
be taken into account, . . . lest the employer's legitimate concerns be
ignored."48 Federal antidiscrimination law prohibits employers from taking
actions based on particular characteristics; 49 however, the law leaves the
employer considerable discretion outside of those specific prohibitions. "In
determining appropriate remedial action, the employee's wrongdoing
becomes relevant not to punish the employee, or out of concern 'for the
relative moral worth of the parties,' but to take due account of the lawful
prerogatives of the employer ...."'0 Given these concerns, the Court held
that "as a general rule in cases of this type," an employment discrimination
plaintiff would lose her right to reinstatement and front pay in the face of
after-acquired evidence," because "[i]t would be both inequitable and
pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer would have

43. Id. at 359-60.
44. Id. at 359; see White & Brussack, supra note 19, at 64-71; Zemelman, supra note 19,
at 182-88. This version of the mixed-motive rule has been supplanted in the meantime by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII to make clear that even in a case of mixed
motives, the employer will be responsible for the role the discriminatory motive played in the
decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
45. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 359-60.
46. Id. at 360.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 361.
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
50. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361 (quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp.,
392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968)).
51. Id. at361-62.
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terminated, and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds."52
The Court acknowledged that a determination of appropriate backpay was
more difficult, but concluded that "[t]he beginning point" should be a
backpay calculation that ends on the day the new evidence was
discovered.53 Beyond these basic contours, the Court was openly hesitant to
specify remedies, noting that "[t]he proper boundaries of remedial relief...
must be addressed ...

in the ordinary course of further decisions, for the

factual permutations and the equitable considerations they raise will vary
from case to case. 54
Attorneys litigating on behalf of Ms. McKennon raised the concern that
permitting after-acquired evidence to limit a defendant's liability would
encourage defendants to use discovery as an aggressive fishing expedition
for such evidence just as the more severe version of the rule had done.55
While acknowledging this concern, the Court concluded:
Once an employer learns about employee wrongdoing that would
lead to a legitimate discharge, we cannot require the employer to
ignore the information, even if it is acquired during the course of
discovery in a suit against the employer and even 56 if the
information might have gone undiscovered absent the suit.
The Court expressed casual faith in lower courts to limit overly-aggressive
efforts to invoke the doctrine:
The concern that employers might as a routine matter undertake
extensive discovery into an employee's background or
performance on the job to resist claims under [federal
antidiscrimination laws] is not an insubstantial one, but we think
the authority of the courts to award attorney's fees .. .and to

invoke the appropriate provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will deter most abuses.57
Unfortunately, the Court's confidence in the authority of lower courts to
deter abuses of the defense failed to properly consider the impact the
defense might have in contexts that courts cannot monitor. All of the tools
the Court considered-whether Rule 11 sanctions, oversight of the
discovery process, or awards of attorney's fees for assertion of frivolous
defenses-require that litigation be fully underway, and that the choices the
52. Id. at 362.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 361.
55. Brief for Petitioner at 39-41, McKennon, 513 U.S. 352 (No. 93-1543), 1994 WL
385636.
56. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362.
57. Id. at 363.
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parties are making be articulated and open to scrutiny. But most litigation
strategy takes place outside of the courtroom. In weighing the potential
effects of a doctrine like the after-acquired evidence defense, the Court
should have given more thought to the consequences it would have for the
choices parties make in the earliest stages of litigation. A more careful
evaluation of the doctrine's impact might have prompted the Court to strike
a different balance between the interests of the employer in controlling the
workplace and the interests of discrimination victims in pursuing their
claims and exposing illegal conduct to the public eye.
B.

The Doctrine as Applied: After-Acquired Evidence in the Courts

While the balance the Court struck in McKennon between the
employees' civil rights and employers' business prerogatives may not have
been the right one, it is clear that the Court was trying to strike some kind of
balance, and that it was counting on the lower courts, in considering
particular cases, to help define the precise contours of this compromise.58
This Part will explore how the lower courts have exercised the discretion
authorized in the Court's opinion. To this end, I have reviewed all reported
opinions through December 31, 2006 that have included mention of the
after-acquired evidence defense in the context of a claim brought under a
federal employment discrimination statute. After briefly describing the
methodology used to analyze this data, this part will discuss a number of
noteworthy aspects of the way after-acquired evidence is deployed and
discussed in judicial opinions.
1. Methodology
This analysis started with an examination of all reported opinions that
discussed the after-acquired evidence doctrine in a claim for violation of
federal employment discrimination laws.59 I chose to focus on federal
58. Id. at 361-63.
59. By reported opinions, I mean cases available on the LexisNexis database, including
both published and unpublished decisions. A search for "after-acquired evidence" with a date
restriction of before December 31, 2006 in the "Federal & State Cases, Combined" database on
Lexis yielded 877 cases. I consulted the ALLCASES database on Westlaw, conducting the same
search, and retrieved 833 documents. I chose to use Lexis as the primary source for this research
because the Lexis search retrieved the larger number of cases. The reason for the different
results is not clear; representatives from Lexis and Westlaw suggested that the explanation
could be connected with proprietary databases, different search algorithms, and differences in
the definition of when a case is "reported." "After-acquired evidence" is a term of art, generally
used both by courts and litigants. I was fairly confident that a search with that term would
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employment discrimination laws-including Title VII,6 ° the Americans with
62
Disabilities Act6 ("ADA"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), the Family and Medical Leave Act6 3 ("FMLA") and 42 U.S.C. §

198164-because similar policy concerns underlie each of these laws and the
courts tend to analogize among the statutes in evaluating procedural and
remedial issues.65 I eliminated cases that raised only state discrimination
claims, as well as federal claims under the National Labor Relations Act,
the Constitution, and other federal laws because of the likelihood that the

competing policy concerns in those various laws might differ in ways that
could affect the scope and applicability of the after-acquired evidence
doctrine. I coded the remaining cases for the type of employee misconduct
that formed the basis for the defense, the procedural stage of litigation in
which the defense arose, and the identity of the winning party on the issue.
After narrowing the search results appropriately, I was left with 273
judicial opinions-1 Supreme Court opinion, 61 federal appellate decisions,
196 federal district court decisions, and 15 state court decisions.66 Of this

capture the entire set of cases I wanted to study, but in order to ensure that the data set did not
exclude opinions using slightly different terminology, I also searched the same databases for
"later acquired evidence," "evidence acquired after," and "evidence acquired later." These
searches yielded a relatively small number of cases, all of which were either repeated in the
original search or irrelevant to employment discrimination.
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2000).
61. Id. §§ 12101-12213.
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
63. Id. §§ 2601-2654.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII and the ADEA were all amended in significant ways by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. In particular, the 1991 Act
amended certain damages provisions of the statutes, and therefore is also an important part of
the policy background against which the scope of the after-acquired evidence doctrine must be
considered. Id.
65. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995);
Sellers v. Mineta, 358 F.3d 1058, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 2004); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 1996); Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229,
1238 (4th Cir. 1995); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11 th Cir. 1995).
66. The data set was substantially narrowed by eliminating cases that had nothing to do
with employment discrimination (mostly criminal, social security, and contract cases). When
the data was limited to cases presenting at least one claim under a federal employment
discrimination statute, it included about 323 cases. I further refined the data set to eliminate
cases in which the concept of "after-acquired evidence" was raised to make an argument
entirely distinct from that presented in McKennon. A small number of cases were removed
because the opinion included only a passing reference to or definition of after-acquired
evidence, with no further discussion. See, e.g., Rooney v. Koch Air, LLC, 410 F.3d 376, 382
(7th Cir. 2005); Marx v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 76 F.3d 324, 329 n.5 (10th Cir. 1996); Border v.
City of Crystal Lake, 75 F.3d 270, 271 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996). In some instances, a single litigation
produced more than one judicial opinion-either a district court decision and an appellate

40:04011

RETALIATORY LITIGATION TA CTICS

number, the after-acquired evidence defense was entirely tangential to fiftyfive of the opinions. In most of these cases, the employer won a summary
judgment motion on the merits of the claim, obviating the need for any
discussion of the doctrine.67 Thus, the analysis relied primarily on a set of
218 cases that addressed the scope and application of the after-acquired
evidence doctrine in varying levels of detail.
One of the immediately noteworthy points about the data is the fact that
this number is so small. By some estimates, roughly one of every seven or
eight federal cases arises under a federal labor or employment statute.68
Further, federal employment discrimination law-particularly Title VIIprovides the allegedly discriminating employer with relatively few defenses
beyond the assertion that discrimination did not motivate the challenged
action. In fact, the after-acquired evidence defense is one of only a handful
of specific defenses available either by statute or judicial opinion.69 Under
these circumstances, one might expect the after-acquired evidence doctrine
to figure in a large number of employment discrimination opinions. And yet
it does not. Some sense of the limited presence of after-acquired evidence in
judicial opinions might be gleaned from the fact that, in the twelve-month
period ending September 30, 2006, federal district courts terminated 11,809
civil rights employment cases through some court action, while fewer than
300 judicial opinions discussed after-acquired evidence in any detail during
the twenty-year period from 1986 to 2006.70 I will return to the question of

decision or a discovery order and a summary judgment ruling, for example. I have included
each judicial opinion as a separate data point in this analysis.
67. Of course, in many of these cases, the courts nonetheless expressed some view on the
merits of the after-acquired evidence claim. In six federal district court cases in which the
employer won summary judgment on entirely unrelated grounds the courts opined that the
employer would also have won on the after-acquired evidence defense, had the case otherwise
had merit. See, e.g., Kalkhorst v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1083 (D.
Colo. 2005).
68. See Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Transformation ofAmerican Labor Unions, 69
Mo. L. REv. 365, 369 n.27 (2004) (noting that labor and employment cases are reported to be
about twelve to fourteen percent of the civil cases on the federal docket).
69. For example, Title VII includes specific statutory defenses for bona fide occupational
qualifications, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (2000); bona fide seniority or merit systems, see
id. § 2000e-2(h); professionally developed ability tests, see id. § 2000e-2(h); compliance with
other laws giving preference to veterans, see id. § 2000e-I 1; and religious discrimination by
purely religious organizations, see id. § 2000e-l. The statute also allows employers to limit their
damages where they can show that they would have made the same decision absent the
discriminatory motivation. See id. § 2000e-5(g). The ADEA includes similarly specific and
similarly limited statutory defenses. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2000).
70. U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken,
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2006, http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2006/appendices/c4.pdf. The comparison is obviously not perfectly parallel; a significant
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why this number is so small and what it might tell us about employment
discrimination litigation in Part III of this Article.
2.

Findings

A few patterns are notable in these judicial discussions of after-acquired
evidence. First, in a substantial majority of cases, the type of employee
misconduct used to assert the defense is resume or application fraud
uncovered during the discovery process. 7 In these cases, it seems quite
likely that the employee's misconduct would never have been discovered if
she had not filed a lawsuit challenging discrimination. Second, courts most
often consider the after-acquired evidence defense during arguments for
summary judgment.72 At this stage, defendants lose more often than they
win, and employers seem willing to assert the defense even in cases where
it seems unlikely to succeed. The defense can also arise in the course of
litigation over the scope of the pleadings, the appropriateness of discovery,
or the admissibility of evidence. In these latter contexts, one can see
particularly how rarely judges exercise their discretion to limit the use of
the doctrine. Finally, despite the doctrine's relatively clear terms,
defendants regularly seek to expand its boundaries.73 As a consequence, the
relevance of a plaintiffs misconduct that was entirely unknown at the time
of the adverse employment decision is debated throughout the litigation,
rather than exclusively at the remedial stage of the dispute.
a. The Most Common Misconduct at Issue Is Resume Fraud,Not
ConfidentialityBreaches or Criminality
After-acquired evidence will only limit the remedies available to a
plaintiff when the employer can "establish that the wrongdoing was of such
severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those
grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the
discharge. 74 In McKennon, the Court accepted as a fact that the plaintiffs
conduct would have warranted her dismissal.75 In later cases, however, this
question has been the central focus of the after-acquired evidence debate.76
number of the cases terminated do not involve a written opinion. Nevertheless, the difference is
dramatic.
71. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
72. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
73. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
74. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362-63 (1995).
75. Id. at 356.
76. See infra notes 82-84.
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Discussions of after-acquired evidence thus focus attention on two
questions: what was the employee's alleged misconduct and what were the
employer's policies or practices in response to that type of misconduct.
One of the clearest patterns in these cases is that the type of misconduct
alleged is more likely to involve resume or application fraud than any other
employee behavior. As the following table details, falsified documentsapplications, resumes, and other statements of qualification-constituted at
least one ground for assertion of the defense in 146 out of 293 instances.77

I

FLSIFIATION OF APPLICATsmall

FALSIFICATION OF APPLICATION
DOCUMENTS 8 TWni~pT
TQCC~Mfh~r
r1~

Unauthorized removal of documents
Violation of confidentiality
Abuse of leave
Violation of policy
Lying
Other79
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE
EMPLOYEE STATUS8"
OTHER8 1
TOTAL

Only

A

I

_

_

a

relatively

146

group of twenty
cases have involved

mi

tthe ttype of eemployee

_

20
10
9
8
7
47
5
8

33
293

misconductunauthorized removal
of
company
documents-at issue
in McKennon.82 A
number of others have
involved conduct that,
while not described in
detail in the opinions,
is likely similar. For

77. The number of grounds for assertion of the after-acquired evidence doctrine is slightly
higher than the total number of judicial opinions discussed in this analysis because a number of
cases involved allegations of more than one type of misconduct by the plaintiff.
78. This category includes alleged dishonesty on applications, resumes, and other
statements of qualification.
79. The variety of on-the-job misconduct asserted in this category spans a wide range of
behavior including moonlighting, sexual harassment, making illicit recordings, theft,
involvement with competitors, plagiarism, and insubordinate behavior, among others. Only a
few specific practices are alleged with any frequency. These practices are included specifically
in the Table.
80. This category includes employer discovery of a plaintiff's medical condition,
immigration status, or employment-related certification.
81. This number includes primarily cases in which the alleged misconduct was never
specified in the opinion.
82. See, e.g., Quinn-Hunt v. Bennett Enters., Inc., 122 F. App'x 205, 206 (6th Cir. 2005);
Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1996); O'Day v. McDonnell
Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1996); Christopher v. Tulsa Ambassador
Hotel, L.L.C., No. 05-CV-500-JHP-SAJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89796, at *8-10 (N.D. Okla.
Dec. 11, 2006).
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example, ten cases involved violations of "confidentiality,"83 and three
discussed alleged "document tampering." 84 Even under this expansive view
of the conduct at issue in McKennon, it represents a fairly small number of
the total allegations.

In the immediate aftermath of the McKennon decision, a number of
courts considered whether there was any justification for treating resume or

application fraud differently than workplace misconduct in the evaluation of
the appropriateness of the after-acquired evidence defense." While some
courts seem to struggle with possible distinctions between the two contexts,

the universal conclusion has been that the after-acquired evidence doctrine
should apply the same way in both.86 A key difference between the two,

however, has been noted by a number of courts: resume and application
fraud are unlikely ever to be discovered after the initial hiring decision
except through the civil discovery process.87 If an employer did not discover
application misstatements at the time of hiring, the costs of going back and

looking for them are sufficiently high that employers generally do not do
this kind of after-the-fact background investigation. The fact that the

plaintiff filed a suit claiming discrimination will thus be the catalyst for the
discovery of her alleged misconduct. By contrast, in the context of on-the-

job malfeasance, it is somewhat more likely that the employer might have
discovered the behavior independent of the discrimination claims.
83. Quinn-Hunt, 122 F. App'x at 206-08; Vaughn v. Sabine County, 104 F. App'x 980,
987-88 (5th Cir. 2004); Dvorak v. Mostardi Platt Assocs., 289 F.3d 479, 487 (7th Cir. 2002);
Smith v. Berry Co., 165 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1999); Schnidrig, 80 F.3d at 1412; O'Day, 79
F.3d at 762-63; Argo v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., No. 03-4119-JAR, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2910, at *19 (D. Kan. Feb. 4, 2005); Adams v. Corporate Realty Servs., Inc., No.
98-1290 (JAG), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9430, at *2 (D.P.R. May 3, 2002); Ducharme v. Hall
Signs, Inc., No. IP99-1756-C-H/G, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22619, at *14-15 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 6,
2001); Blake-McIntosh v. Cadbury Beverages, Inc., No. 3:96-CV-2554 (EBB), 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16550, at *15-16 (D. Conn. Aug. 10, 1999).
84. Gorin v. Apollo Travel Servs., No. 1:97-cv-348-JOF, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22209,
*9-10 (D. Ga. July 21, 1999); Kaplan v. Banque Nationale de Paris, No.94 Civ. 3965 (LLS),
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18885, at *23-24 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1995); Dranchak v. Akzo Am.,
Inc., No. 92 C 1295, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6824, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 1993).
85. See, e.g., Wehr v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., No. 95-6101, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26766, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 1996); Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d
1072, 1074 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995).
86. Interestingly, one of the distinctions most frequently urged on the courts was
defendants' argument that in cases of resume fraud the doctrine should be applied with a looser
standard, requiring only that the employer demonstrate that it would not have hired the
employee had it known at the time of application of the misrepresentation. See infra Part
II.B.2.c.
87. See, e.g., Wehr, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 26766, at *2; Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 62
F.3d 374, 377 (11th Cir. 1995); Mardell, 65 F.3d at 1073 n.1; Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts,
Inc., 49 F.3d 1106, 1108 (5th Cir. 1995).
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Whatever the employee misconduct at issue, a defendant is unlikely to be
successful at summary judgment with the after-acquired evidence defense
except where the employer's policies against particular conduct are
documented and enforced."8 Some courts have held that even explicit
policies cannot establish the defense as a matter of law if there is any
suggestion that the employer's actual practices differ from its stated
policies.89 And in cases involving allegations of application fraud, a number
of courts require that the alleged misrepresentation have been "material,
directly related to measuring a candidate for employment, and

. . .

relied

upon by the employer in making the hiring decision."90 These standards
make summary judgment the exception rather than the rule in after-acquired
evidence cases. Of 132 summary judgment opinions in this study, only
thirty-six cases saw the court granting the defendant's motion for summary
judgment as to the damages-limiting defense.9 In these cases, the courts
concluded that the employers' policies were sufficiently clear, and the
plaintiffs' misconduct sufficiently serious, that the defense was established
as a matter of law. By contrast, in sixty-five of the cases courts denied
summary judgment on this issue because the employer could not
unequivocally show that it would have fired the employee for the particular
conduct in question. These cases involve employers' policies that were
stated in ambiguous terms, were inconsistently enforced, or raised a
question of whether the employee's conduct rose to a sufficiently serious
level to violate the policy. 92
The frequency with which employers assert the defense despite these
serious questions about its applicability suggests that the defense is being
raised in cases in which arguments supporting it are at least weak, if not
frivolous. Moreover, almost half of the after-acquired evidence cases in the
88. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Prod. Action Int'l, Inc., No. CIVA 04-231 KSF, 2006 WL
3747519, at *17 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 18, 2006).
89. See, e.g., O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir.
1996) ("The inquiry focuses on the employer's actual employment practices, not just the
standards established in its employee manuals, and reflects a recognition that employers often
say they will discharge employees for certain misconduct while in practice they do not.");
accord Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1048 (7th Cir. 1999).
90. Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992); see also
McNair v. Computer Data Sys., Inc., No. 98-1110, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1017, at *21 (4th
Cir. Jan. 26, 1999); Aubuchon v. Knauf Fiberglass, GMBH, 240 F. Supp. 2d 859, 863 (S.D. Ind.
2003); Bazzi v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 808 F. Supp. 1306, 1308 (E.D. Mich 1992).
91. In thirty-one cases, the courts dismissed the plaintiffs' claims at summary judgment
without requiring any ruling on the after-acquired evidence question.
92. See, e.g., Predzik v. Shelter Corp., No. 05-1063 (JRT/FLN), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
70250, at *17 (D. Minn. Sept. 27, 2006) (finding that the employee handbook stated that
employee "may" be terminated; this equivocal language was insufficient to satisfy the burden of
establishing a "settled" company policy).
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courts involve resume fraud that would likely have remained undiscovered
if the employee had not made a claim under federal law. These facts
together raise precisely the concern that the Supreme Court described as
"not insubstantial" in McKennon-that the doctrine would be abused by
employers seeking to deter the assertion of civil rights claims.93 The Court's
proposed solution to this potential problem was to rely on the discretion of
the district courts to deter abuse.94
b.

Courts Rarely Exercise Discretion to Limit the Use of the Defense

There is little suggestion in reported opinions that many courts are
exercising discretion to limit the reach of after-acquired evidence. The
defense is considered primarily in three procedural contexts: at summary
judgment, in motions to amend the pleadings, and in disputes over the scope
of discovery and the admissibility of evidence. 95 While judges inevitably
exercise some discretion, particularly in the latter two contexts, it is used
more to permit the defense than to limit it.
Of the 196 federal district court decisions included in this study, 132 are
on motions for summary judgment. This high proportion of summary
judgment decisions may be explained by a number of factors. Courts are
more likely to publish decisions at summary judgment than at other stages
of litigation.9 6 Summary judgment also presents, in many cases, the first
point at which the parties make all of their legal arguments to the court;
thus, in a substantial number of disputes, this may be the first stage at which
the court is presented with the after-acquired evidence question. Before the
Supreme Court's decision in McKennon, after-acquired evidence appeared
almost exclusively as an argument at summary judgment, where defendants
asserted it as a ground for dismissing plaintiffs' suits in their entirety.9 7
Post-McKennon defendants still raise the defense at summary judgment, but
now as one of several arguments, in the hopes that if the court denies a

93. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 363 (1995).
94. Id.
95. The doctrine does occasionally arise in other contexts, but these are the only
procedural postures in which it appears more than once or twice.
96. See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The
Paradoxof Losing by Winning, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 869, 883 (1999); Siegelman & Donohue,
supra note 12, at 1146 (noting that opinions that dispose of a case are more likely to be
published than those that do not).
97. Elissa J. Preheim, Discrimination,Deceit, and Legal Decoys: The Diversion of AfterAcquired Evidence and the Focus Restored by McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Company, 71 IND. L.J. 235, 236 (1995) (describing courts entering summary judgment against
employees on discovery of the after-acquired evidence); Zemelman, supra note 19, at 176
(noting that courts "routinely grant employers summary judgment").
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motion to dismiss the case entirely it will at least grant partial summary
judgment on the damages-limiting defense.

Aftr-Aq~redEvdene nd UMM11Y.LIC1-111ntAs

noted

earlier, in the
Summary judgment denied on after-acquired evidence
sixty-five
Summary judgment granted on after-acquired evidence
opinions
grounds
Summary judgment granted on other
where courts
Total
have denied
defendants' motions for summary judgment on the after-acquired evidence
issue, it has generally been because issues of fact remained as to whether
the alleged violation was sufficiently serious that the employer
unquestionably would have fired the employee as a result.98 Because the
after-acquired evidence doctrine presents courts with a purely hypothetical
question-whether the employer would have fired the plaintiff for the
challenged conduct-it creates by its own terms a material question of fact
over which some dispute is very likely. It is thus the kind of question where
it would be harder to prevail on summary judgment.99 The significantly
higher number of defendant losses on the question reflects this procedural
standard, but it may also suggest that employers are willing to assert the
defense even in fairly borderline cases.
The fact questions keep the defense in play throughout the litigation and
allow continuing focus on the plaintiffs misconduct. This shift in focus
may benefit the defendant by putting the pressure of embarrassment and
exposure on the plaintiff and by influencing the court, and potentially the
jury, in its assessment of the true harm done to the plaintiff. Thus, losing a
summary judgment motion on after-acquired evidence is not as detrimental
to a defendant as it might initially appear. Courts denying these motions are
not significantly limiting the ultimate availability of the defense or its
impact on the course of litigation; they are simply requiring the defendant to
overcome the plaintiffs factual refutations.
When courts have considered whether to allow defendants to amend their
answers to assert the defense they have been more likely than not to permit
inclusion of the defense. Courts confronting this issue are addressing the
most basic, and still unsettled, procedural questions about the doctrine: what
is it and when should it be raised? In many respects, after-acquired evidence
65
36
31
132

98. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
99. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that summary judgment is appropriate when there is
no disputed question of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law).
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looks like a fairly typical affirmative defense.' 00 If that is what it is, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) requires that the defense be included in the
defendant's answer or be considered as waived.' ' A few courts have treated
it exactly this way, and have rejected defendants' efforts to raise the defense
later in the proceedings.'02 Most, however, have allowed defendants to
assert the defense despite lack of compliance with pleading requirements.
Among these courts, some have concluded that, although defendants have
an affirmative burden to prove the defense, the unusual fact that its
application may only become apparent during the discovery process
distinguishes it from a traditional affirmative defense.0 3 Others have found
that the discretion granted by McKennon and by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15 (governing amendments to pleadings) warrants permitting the
defendant to amend its answer to include the defense, even fairly late in the
proceedings.0 4
100. Like other affirmative defenses, the after-acquired evidence doctrine more or less
admits to the general complaint of discrimination and yet suggests a tangential argument-on
which the defendant rather than the plaintiff bears the burden of proof-for why there is no
right to full compensation. See, e.g., 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1270 (3d ed. 2004).
101. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
102. See, e.g., Hickman v. South Whidbey Sch. Dist. #206, No. C05-1313C, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 68890, at *6-7 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2006) (rejecting defendant's request to
amend its answer after a deadline and noting that "[d]efendants provide no reason why they did
not anticipate this defense from the beginning in what was obviously an employment-related
action"); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 231 F.R.D. 159, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Santos v.
Boeing Co., No. 02 C 9310, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22558, at *16-17 (N.D. I11.
Nov. 4, 2004);
Jones v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 75 F. Supp. 2d 885, 887 (N.D. I11.
1999); see
also Gipson v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 239 F.R.D. 280, 281 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting that
defendant had included after-acquired evidence in its answer without supporting information in
order to preserve the defense).
103. See, e.g., Shah v. James P. Purcell Assocs., No. 3:05-CV-00306, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45317, at *4-5 (D. Conn. July 5, 2006); EEOC v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Group,
Inc., No. 4:04-CV-846 CAS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22572, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 5, 2005) ("It
is unclear whether the after-acquired evidence theory is an affirmative defense that must be
pled."); EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 01 Civ. 8421 (RMB)(RLE), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23727, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2002); Arnold v. City of Dayton, No. 1:92-cv-562, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21224, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 21, 1994) ("First, the after-acquired evidence
defense need not be pleaded as an affirmative defense. As this Court [has] noted ... the very
nature of the defense at times results in it being raised well into the litigation. It would therefore
be impractical to require a defendant to plead the defense in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(c).").
104. See, e.g., Wells v. Orange County Sch. Bd., No. 6:05-cv-479-Orl-28DAB, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 81265, at *9-10 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2006) (permitting an amendment after the
close of discovery where the plaintiff had hacked into school computer system, allowing the
plaintiff additional discovery to respond to the defense); McCoy v. Deffenbaugh Indus., No. 042353-KHV-DJW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8805, at *3-4 (D. Kan. May 4, 2005); Hoellering v.
Nordyne, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 259, 260 (W.D. Mo. 2001) (permitting the answer to be amended to
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By their nature, these disputes invite the exercise of discretion by the
courts, and this set of opinions certainly treats them that way. The decision
whether to permit amendment in many of the cases, for example, seems to
turn on the specificity and seriousness of the alleged misconduct," 5 the
extent of the defendant's delay in asserting the defense,0 6 or the possibility
of conducting additional discovery to allow the plaintiff to respond to the
allegations.'0 7 Significantly, though, most of the cases (twelve as compared
to four) involve discretion exercised to expand the availability of the
defense, not to limit it.
In discovery disputes as well, it is most typical for courts to permit broad
discovery directed at uncovering evidence of plaintiff misconduct that
might support the defense.' °8 In fifteen reported decisions, courts have
refused to limit discovery or exclude evidence supporting the defense, while
only eight opinions involve any limitation on defendants' requested
discovery. 0 9 Because courts are more likely to permit discovery than to
limit it, and also more likely to write opinions when they take the less
typical course and impose limitations, ° these numbers probably understate
the regularity with which courts deny plaintiffs' efforts to limit expansive
discovery. Of course, some courts have cast a very critical eye upon the
scope of defendants' requested discovery and have imposed limitations on
include the defense); Blandin v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., No 4:96CV1130-DJS, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23331, at *4-5 (E.D. Mo. May 6, 1997) (permitting the answer to be amended after the
close of discovery and allowing limited additional discovery on the defense).
105. See, e.g., Hickman, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68890, at *3-5 (refusing to permit an
amendment of the defendant's answer to assert some unspecified conduct as after-acquired
evidence).
106. See, e.g., Zubulake, 231 F.R.D. at 161-62.
107. See, e.g., Wells, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81265, at *9.
108. See, e.g., Serrano v. Cintas Corp., No. 04-40132, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12664, at *4
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2006); Hankins v. City of Philadelphia, No. 95-1449, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14809, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 1996).
109. Compare Shah v. James P. Purcell Assocs., No. 3:05-CV-00306, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45317, at *3-5 (D. Conn. July 5, 2006) (allowing discovery into the plaintiff's alleged
violation of a company rule to support defense), and Richmond v. UPS Serv. Parts Logistics,
No. IPO1-1412-C-H/G, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7496, at *9-11 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 25, 2002)
(allowing discovery into an employee's past employment applications to support defense), with
Maxwell v. Health Ctr. of Lake City, Inc., No. 3:05-cv-1056-J-32MCR, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36774, at * 13-14 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2006) (refusing to permit employer discovery into all of the
plaintiffs past employer records without some independent reason to suspect past misconduct
that would support the defense), and Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 220 F.R.D. 661, 66465 (D. Kan. 2004) (cautioning against a "fishing expedition" to support the defense).
110. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendment
(observing that "[o]n the whole . . . district judges have been reluctant to limit the use of
discovery devices"). When judges do impose limits, they generally do so through protective
orders, which are memorialized in writing. See id. 26(c).
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overly aggressive requests."' Protective orders may be necessary, one court
explained, where defendants' discovery requests "look like nothing more

than a fishing expedition, or, more accurately, an exercise in swampdrudging and muck-racking.""' Additionally, two courts have taken the
position that the after-acquired evidence defense "should not be used as an
independent basis to initiate discovery.""' 3 However, these cases are
exceptions to a generally permissive approach to discovery into a plaintiffs
background.

Examining this range of procedural contexts in which the after-acquired
evidence defense arises, there is little evidence that courts are in any
significant way limiting defendants' use of the doctrine. Moreover, as
discussed further in Part III, much of the impact of the doctrine occurs
either early in a dispute, or in the development of litigation strategies by the
parties, and thus would not appear in opinions or be subject to any exercise
of discretion by the court. Thus, the Supreme Court's assurance that abuse

of the doctrine could be managed through judicial control over litigation
conduct may have reflected an excess of confidence in managerial judging.
c.

Defendants Seek to Expand the Doctrine

A final significant trend
make arguments that would
permit use of after-acquired
role in the litigation." 4 In

in the cases is the tendency for defendants to
expand the after-acquired evidence doctrine or
evidence in other contexts, thus increasing its
some instances, information obtained during

111. See, e.g., Graham v. Casey's Gen. Stores, 206 F.R.D. 251, 256 (S.D. Ind. 2002)
(distinguishing the defendant's more limited discovery requests from those made in another
case; granting some of the requested discovery and denying other parts); Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1339-41 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
112. Graham, 206 F.R.D. at 255 (internal quotation omitted); see also Allender, 220 F.R.D.
at 664-65.
113. Premer v. Corestaff Servs., L.P., 232 F.R.D. 692, 693 (M.D. Fla. 2005); see also
Maxwell, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36774, at *14 ("The Court finds that Defendant has failed to
assert any pre-existing basis for the belief that after-acquired evidence of Plaintiff's wrongdoing
exists. As such, [Defendant] cannot use this doctrine to initiate discovery that is otherwise not
relevant.").
114. Occasionally, plaintiffs also try to shoehorn other kinds of arguments into an afteracquired evidence frame. A significant group of these cases involved a dispute over whether
particular employee conduct constituted after-acquired evidence or a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. In these instances, the debate between
the employee and the employer is over the point-in-time at which the employer learned of the
misconduct. In these disputes, it is usually the employee who argues that the evidence was
"after-acquired" in an attempt to dispute its legitimacy as a non-discriminatory explanation for
the employer's decision. See, e.g., Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 375 F.3d 1228,
1232 (11th Cir. 2004); Dvorak v. Mostardi Platt Assocs., 289 F.3d 479, 487 (7th Cir. 2002);
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discovery, but unknown before the litigation commenced, is used to
challenge not just a plaintiff's damages, but also the core of her claim.
Several courts, for example, agreed with the defendants' arguments that
after-acquired evidence should be available to disprove the plaintiffs'
coverage under the relevant statute." 5 In these cases, the dispute is not about
the defendants' reasons for taking action against the plaintiffs, but whether
federal law should apply to the case at all. After-acquired evidence is also
sometimes used to rebut elements of a plaintiffs prima facie case; for
example, where a plaintiff claims to have been well-respected by peers, an
employer might seek to rebut that argument with information acquired after
termination that demonstrates lack of that respect." '6 While the information
played no role in the employer's challenged decision, it thus becomes
pivotal to the lawsuit.
While these examples involved defendants' efforts to bring in evidence
of employee behavior or reputation learned during discovery to support a
variety of arguments about the legitimacy of the original decision, another
group of cases demonstrates defendants' efforts to expand the reach of the
doctrine itself. One recurring question is whether employee misconduct that
occurs after termination by the defendant employer should be relevant to the
defense." 7 Employers argue that, because the theory underlying the
remedies limitation is that the employee would no longer be employable at
the particular workplace, post-termination conduct is clearly relevant to the
possibility of reinstatement. A few courts have accepted this argument and
extended the doctrine to cover post-termination conduct." 8 Other courts
have been unwilling to expand the doctrine, noting that "[e]quity may
require that some effect be given to the employee's wrongdoing during
employment, even if it was not known to the employer. However, when the
after-acquired evidence involve[d] misconduct that occurred only after
McNair v. Computer Data Sys., Inc., No. 98-1110, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1017, at *21 n.3 (4th
Cir. Jan. 26, 1999).
115. See, e.g., Bauer v. Varity Dayton-Walther Corp., 118 F.3d 1109, 1112 (6th Cir. 1997)
(permitting after-acquired evidence to determine whether termination of the defendant's
employment was valid under the FMLA).
116. See, e.g., Rakow v. North Dakota ex rel. State Bd. of Higher Educ., No. 98-3503, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 2691, at *4-5 (8th Cir. Feb. 24, 2000).
117. See Todd J. McNamara & Kristina James, Post Termination Conduct and the AfterAcquired Evidence Rule: An Arrow on Target or an Empty Quiver?, TRIAL TALK, June/July
2005, at 29, 29-30; Harold R. Bickham & Mark W. Clark, After-Acquired Evidence in
Employment Discrimination Cases, PRAc. LITIGATOR, Jan. 2005, at 13, 18; see also Sellers v.
Mineta, 358 F.3d 1058, 1065 (8th Cir. 2004); Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545,
555 (10th Cir. 1999); Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 901 F. Supp. 667, 682-83

(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
118. See Sellers, 358 F.3d at 1063; Medlock, 164 F.3d at 554-55.
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employment terminated, that misconduct is even more distant from the
employer's decision-making process."1'19
In another distinct group of cases, employers have sought a looser
standard for the after-acquired evidence defense in cases of resume fraud
than in cases of on-the-job misconduct.1 20 In these cases, defendants argue,
they should not have to prove that they would have fired the plaintiff had
they known of the resume fraud at the time of termination.121 Instead, they
should be able to make use of the defense if they can demonstrate that, had
they known at the time of hiring of the misrepresentations, they would not
have hired the plaintiff.'22 The "would-not-have-hired" standard is generally
recognized as a more lenient standard for defendants, as it permits the
counterfactual assumption that the entire course of the relationship between
employer and employee had not existed. 23 Employers will often overlook
conduct in a current employee that they would not tolerate in an
applicant.2 4 Courts
have, for the most part, rejected the "would-not-have25
hired" standard.

The common trait among this range of efforts to expand the doctrine is
that all of the arguments reflect a tendency to shift attention away from the
reasons the employer had for making its decision at a particular point in
time and onto the qualifications or worth of the plaintiff at other points in
time. Therefore all are, in one way or another, unrelated to whether the
employer's actions were taken for discriminatory reasons. These efforts to
119. Carr v. Woodbury County Juvenile Det. Ctr., 905 F. Supp. 619, 628 (N.D. Iowa 1995);
see also Pace v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, No. 05-cv-01562-LTB-MJW, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 91481, at *14-18 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2006); Sigmon, 901 F. Supp. at 682-83 ("In the
instant situation, defendant and plaintiff were not in an employer-employee relationship at the
time of the alleged incident. Therefore any complaint defendant has against plaintiff for her
post-employment conduct falls outside of the McKennon rule, and outside of Title VII."); Argo
v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., No. 03-4119-JAR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2910, at
*19-20 (D. Kan. Feb. 4, 2005); Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 879 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Pa.
1995).
120. See, e.g., Roberts v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Okla. Colleges, No. 95-6235,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6679, at *14-15 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 1997); McNemar v. Disney Store,
Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 613-14, 619-20 (3d Cir. 1996); Quillen v. Am. Tobacco Co., 874 F. Supp.
1285, 1295-96 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
121. See cases cited supra note 120.
122. See, e.g., Femidaramola v. Lextron Corp., No. 3:05CV643JS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67047, at *21 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 18, 2006) (stating the employer's argument that it would not
have hired the plaintiff had it known of his failure to disclose his previous employment on his
job application); Jackson v. ABC Nissan, Inc., No. CV-03-0563-PHX-SMM, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 59347, at *51-53 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2006).
123. See, e.g., Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106, 1108 (5th Cir. 1995);
Thompson, supra note 6, at 657-58.
124. See, e.g., Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1992).
125. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 656-59.
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move the doctrine into other contexts are not unexpected; it is part of the
nature of legal argument in a system that develops law by analogy that
litigators will argue for novel applications of principles like that established
in McKennon.126 Their presence is nonetheless important, as it reminds us
that the ability of litigants to expand the doctrine is real and that potential is
an essential aspect of the doctrine's impact on employment discrimination
litigation.
The 274 reported cases that have discussed after-acquired evidence in the
past two decades tell some interesting stories. They reveal a litigation tool
that defendants are permitted to raise even after the early pleadings stages of
litigation, and about which courts generally allow broad discovery. The
defense thus gives defendants broad warrant to investigate the backgrounds
of employment discrimination claimants. And much of the evidence
uncovered in this search-in particular instances of resume and application
fraud-would not likely have come to light had it not been for the plaintiffs'
claims of discrimination. The picture that this data presents of how afteracquired evidence operates in employment discrimination cases, though
informative, is only part of the story. Only a small percentage of cases stay
active long enough to generate a judicial opinion. Moreover, judges often
resolve discovery and other pretrial matters without a written opinion, so
any dispute that is likely to arise in discovery-as this is-may be captured
only partially by a study of legal opinions. In Part III, therefore, this Article
will consider some of the reasons that the defense might not show up in
published judicial text and will explore the impact the after-acquired
evidence doctrine may have at earlier stages of litigation.
III.

WHAT COURTS DON'T SAY (AND MIGHT NOT KNow) ABOUT AFTERACQUIRED EVIDENCE

There are several plausible practical and strategic explanations for the
small number of judicial opinions discussing after-acquired evidence. It
could be that the defense is rarely asserted because very few potential
plaintiffs engage in conduct that defendants might use to assert the defense.
Evidence from human resource experts suggests, however, that quite the
opposite is true. The kind of conduct that most frequently supports the
defense is reportedly common.' 27 It may be, however, that employer policies
are not as rigidly enforced as courts require for an early application of the
defense. Another possible explanation is that the evidence of employee
126. See, e.g., Albiston, supra note 96, at 893-94.
127. See infra Part III.A.
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misconduct that would support an after-acquired evidence defense comes
into litigation in other ways, for example as impeachment material or in
support of counterclaims; these uses of the information may provide
defendants many of the same benefits without the costs and burdens of
asserting an affirmative defense. Yet another explanation might be found in
the early conduct of litigation: potential plaintiffs whose conduct would
support an after-acquired evidence defense might not be getting far enough
into litigation for their cases to appear in reported opinions with any
frequency. Interviews with both plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers suggest
that this is, indeed, part of the story.
This Part will evaluate these various explanations. It will first consider
the available data on the frequency of employee misconduct that might
support an after-acquired evidence defense and will explore what incentives
defendants might have to avoid the after-acquired evidence defense itself,
while making use of the same evidence in other ways. It will then present
the results of interviews with practicing attorneys to describe how afteracquired evidence affects the earliest stages of a potential plaintiffs efforts
to vindicate the rights granted by the federal laws prohibiting
discrimination.
A.

The Frequency of Employee Misconduct and the Flexibility of
Employer Policies

Employee misconduct is not especially unusual. In particular, the type of
misconduct that is most frequently asserted in support of the after-acquired
evidence defense-application and resume fraud-is quite prevalent. Thus,
the incidence of misconduct cannot alone explain the relatively small
number of after-acquired evidence cases.
A precise assessment of the number of resumes or job applications that
contain some inaccuracies is impossible to make and any estimates are
likely to be low, given the number of misrepresentations that go unnoticed.
Some recent studies by human resource experts, however, suggest that
128
between a quarter and half of all resumes contain misstatements.
128. See, e.g., John E. Matejkovic & Margaret E. Matejkovic, Whom to Hire: Rampant
Misrepresentations of Credentials Mandate the Prudent Employer Make Informed Hiring
Decisions, 39 CREIGHTON L. REv. 827, 828 (2006); Mike Aamodt, How Common Is Resume
Fraud?, ASSESSMENT COUNCIL NEWS (IPMA-HR Assessment Council, Alexandria, Va.), Dec.
2002, at 7, availableat http://www.ipmaac.org/acn/acn_0302.pdf (summarizing various studies
that found resume fraud in a range of eleven percent to sixty-seven percent of cases); Pamela
Babcock, Spotting Lies: As a First Line of Defense, HR Can Take Steps to Weed Out Dishonest
Applicants, HR MAG., Oct. 2003, http://www.shrm.org/hrnagazine/articles/1003/1003
babcock.asp ("[A]bout 30 percent of all job applicants make material misrepresentations on
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Websites offering fake diplomas, resumes, and other credentials tout the
ease with which clients can use their products.' 29 And high profile cases of

padded resumes and falsified qualifications are regular fodder for the
press.13

Other types of workplace misconduct are also reported to occur with
some frequency. Like resume fraud, on-the-job misconduct of varying
degrees of seriousness almost certainly goes under-detected and underreported. But employee theft is widely viewed as costing businesses
millions of dollars each year. In one recent online survey, ten percent of
respondents admitted to stealing from their employers. 3' Likewise, a 2005
study by the Ethics Resource Center found that more than half of American
workers have observed unethical or illegal conduct at work. 3 2 Nineteen
percent of those responding said they had observed co-workers lying;
sixteen percent observed violations of safety regulations; sixteen percent
observed misreporting of time worked; eleven percent saw co-workers steal
from the workplace; and nine percent reported that they had observed one
co-worker engage in sexual harassment of another.'33 A recent study by the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration found that one
in twelve employees admitted to using illegal substances within the

resumes .. ");Charles R. McConnell, Watching Outfor Resume Fraud,NFIB, Sept. 28, 2004,
http://www.nfib.com/object/IO_ 8008.html.
129. See, e.g., Fake Resume, http://www.fakeresume.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); see
also Creola Johnson, Credentialism and the Proliferation of Fake Degrees: The Employer
Pretends to Need a Degree; the Employee Pretends to Have One, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
269, 271 (2006).
130. See Matejkovic & Matejkovic, supra note 128, at 827 (describing how the man chosen
to be poet laureate of California instead lost his career when his misrepresentations about his
education were revealed); Patricia Sabatini, Experts Say Many Resumes Contain Fibs, Some
Big, Some Small, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 24, 2006, at El, available at
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06055/660332.stm (describing resume fraud by CEOs of
RadioShack and Veritas and by Notre Dame football coach George Leary); Zak Sos & Richard
Davis, MIT Dean Resigns in Lying Scandal, CNN.coM,
Apr. 29, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/americas/04/27/mit.dean/index.html
(recounting
the
resignation of MIT's Dean of Admissions because of revelations that she had misrepresented
her education).
131. Press Release, Jennifer Grasz, CareerBuilder.com, Thirty-Eight Percent of Managers
Say They Have Fired Someone for Stealing at the Office, CareerBuilder.com's Survey Finds
(Aug.
22,
2006),
http://www.careerbuilder.com/share/aboutus/pressreleasesdetai.aspx?id=pr32 I&ed= 12/31/2006
&sd=8/22/2006 (stating results from a survey of 2,200 responses from a random sample of
comScore Network panel members conducted from June 6 to June 16, 2006).
132. Press Release, Ethics Res. Ctr., Survey Documents State of Ethics in the Workplace
(Oct. 12, 2005), availableat http://www.ethics.org/research/2005-press-release.asp.
133. Id.
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preceding month.'34 Given this level of reported on-the-job misconduct and
resume misrepresentation, it seems likely that extensive discovery into the
backgrounds and work records of a very high percentage of employees
would uncover some past inconsistencies or violations.
Of course, not all of this misconduct would clearly violate established
workplace policies or practices. For example, while resume fraud as a
general matter is likely to violate the stated policies of most employers,
there is almost certainly a spectrum of conduct, with some (like lying about
degrees or required certification) providing clear grounds for termination
and some (like misstating dates of prior employment) more apt to be
overlooked. Similarly, abuse of work internet access for personal purposes
by an employee is more likely to lead to dismissal if the employee is
purchasing pornography than if he is emailing his parents. The discretionary
element in employer policies that permits these kinds of distinctions is one
of the significant limitations of the after-acquired evidence doctrine as a
defense litigation tool. Employer discretion often interferes with employer
success in asserting the defense; even more often it precludes partial
summary judgment.135 The factual questions inherent in the defense mean
that it is unlikely to lead even to partial summary judgment in most cases.
Employers are probably not going to make their workplace policies more
concrete solely to improve the effectiveness of this defense for curtailing
damages. Various countervailing concerns-like the need for flexibility and
the desire to avoid the unintended creation of contractual obligations-give
employers incentives to avoid overly specific policies.'36 Thus, while the
small number of after-acquired evidence cases cannot be explained by an
argument that only a small number of employees engage in misconduct, it
may in part be attributed to the fact that many employers do not have
policies that unambiguously prohibit a wide range of common employee
conduct.

134. See Tamara Schweitzer, More Employees Admit Drug Use, Alcohol Abuse, INC.COM,
July 23, 2007, http://www.inc.com/news/articles/200707/drugs.html.

135. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
136. See Interview with Denver management attorney (Apr. 2007). ("Employers loathe
having written policies-the more they have, the more trouble they get into. If written policies

are the test, then employers will not benefit much from after-acquired evidence."); see also infra
note 141.
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Employer Litigation Strategy and the Many Uses of Plaintiff
Misconduct

Some of the value of the after-acquired evidence defense is that it lets
defendants tell the jury about unseemly behavior by the plaintiff, and
employers do not necessarily need to assert the defense to get the same
damaging evidence into court. There are other opportunities to bring
employee misconduct to the court's attention without having to meet the
burden established in McKennon of demonstrating that the conduct was
sufficiently severe, and the policy sufficiently clear, that it would have
resulted in termination. In many instances, information that will support the
defense will also support an attack on the plaintiffs credibility as a
witness.' 37 Thus, in a case where the employer's policies and practices may
not be clear-cut enough to make the defense a useful tool for curtailing
litigation, the acts of employee misconduct may still serve a valuable
purpose by discrediting the plaintiff in the eyes of the judge and jury. Of
course, this is going to be a less certain route for the employer. With
impeachment testimony, the court will balance the probative value of the
evidence against its prejudicial effect and may not permit the defendant to
introduce particularly damaging evidence.138 The after-acquired evidence
doctrine is thus useful to defendants because the admission of evidence
being used to support the defense is much less discretionary.
Employee misconduct may be used in other ways as well. In
circumstances where the misconduct is particularly serious, an employer
may use it as the basis for asserting counterclaims against a former
employee. This strategy only works where the misconduct would in fact
support a claim, but recent cases have seen counterclaims for breach of
fiduciary duty and breach of contract in which the evidence underlying the
counterclaim is also argued to support an after-acquired evidence defense.'39
Perhaps even more importantly, where there is ambiguity about when the
employer discovered the misconduct, it may be possible for the employer to
137. See, e.g., EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 1994); Lewis v. City
of Garland, No. 3:05-CR-0683-L, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23855, at *6-7 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 14,
2005); Richmond v. UPS Serv. Parts Logistics, No. IPO1-1412-C-H/G, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

7496, at *10-11 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 25, 2002); Graham v. Casey's Gen. Stores, 206 F.R.D. 251, 255
(S.D. Ind. 2002); Adelman v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., No. 97-691, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1211, at *7-9 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 5, 1998).
138. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
139. See, e.g., Stewart v. Lamar Adver. of Pa., L.L.C., No. 03-2914, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
709, at *13-15 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2004); Halloum v. Intel Corp., CIV-02-2245 PHX JWS, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20374, at *7 & n.19 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2003); Riad v. 520 S. Michigan Ave.
Assocs., No. 97 C 2488, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7646, at *38 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2000);
Adamson v. Dataco Derex, Inc., 178 F.R.D. 562, 565 n.4 (D. Kan. 1998).
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include the plaintiff's malfeasance as a legitimate non-discriminatory reason
for the termination. Success in this defense is certainly preferable to
limiting damages, as it gives the defendant a complete victory in the suit. In
a sizable group of cases in the data set discussed in Part II, the afteracquired evidence argument was raised by the plaintiff, who was asserting
that the defendant was trying to use evidence acquired after termination as a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the decision. 4 ' Given the burdens
the employer bears in proving the after-acquired evidence defense, the
employer may find more appealing litigation options in taking advantage of
the employee's misconduct for impeachment purposes or to support a
counterclaim or a broader defense.
So, while incidents of employee misconduct that could be used in
asserting the defense may actually be fairly common, the defense incentives
may push toward other ways to use that misconduct in litigation. This
dynamic offers another explanation for the small number of after-acquired
evidence cases.
C.

Early Outs: The Impact of Employee Misconduct at the Initial
Stages of Litigation
Another possible reason that judges rarely write about after-acquired
evidence is that potential lawsuits by plaintiffs who have engaged in
significant misconduct do not make it far enough through the litigation
process to appear in judicial opinions. This Section reports the results of
interviews with ten plaintiffs' lawyers and ten defendants' lawyers in major
metropolitan areas around the country. All of the lawyers handle
exclusively or primarily employment litigation. The interviews were
conducted between February 2007 and July 2007 and included lawyers
from Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New
York, San Francisco, and Washington D.C. 1 ' These interviews reveal that
140. See, e.g., Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 375 F.3d 1228, 1232 (1 1th Cir.
2004); Fulkerson v. AmeriTitle, Inc., 64 F. App'x 63, 65 (9th Cir. 2003); Dvorak v. Mostardi
Platt Assocs., 289 F.3d 479, 487 (7th Cir. 2002). In total, this group included ten cases, both
district court and appellate. Plaintiffs were consistently unsuccessful in countering a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason by challenging the timing of the defendant's knowledge of
misconduct.
141. This summary includes both direct quotes from lawyers and some paraphrasing of the
interviews. The interviews were conducted by phone, with some follow-up email
communication. None of the interviews were taped, but notes from each of them are on file with
the author. In order to encourage candor, the individual lawyers were told they would not be
specifically named. Where direct quotes are included in the Article, they are attributed by
geography and practice type.
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the after-acquired evidence doctrine, and the kinds of employee misconduct
that undergird it, have a significant impact on potential suits, both before
litigation ever occurs and in the early stages of litigation.
The interviews confirm that the lines between after-acquired evidence
and other doctrines are very blurred in the framing of a case and a discovery
plan. Evidence that could support the after-acquired evidence defense might
also present a serious challenge to the plaintiff's credibility or to the
plaintiff's performance on the job. Where there is a question as to whether
evidence will rise to the level to support after-acquired evidence, some
defendants' lawyers report that they make a judgment early on to structure
their inquiries more on the misconduct's relationship to the plaintiffs
performance or qualifications. 42 Some lawyers who regularly work with
defendants report that if employers really care about resume fraud, they will
catch it early; and if they do not care that much, it becomes extremely
difficult to prove that the plaintiff would have been fired for the
dishonesty.' 43 In this circumstance, focusing on the resume or application
fraud for impeachment purposes will clearly be more effective than trying
to assert the defense.
Further, the interviews confirm that it is not always clear when an
employer knew of the misconduct. Thus, employers may often want to
frame the discussion as an "either/or situation: it was a non-discriminatory
reason for the firing at the time, or, in the alternative, it was after-acquired
evidence."' 44 So, someone in an organization might have known about the
employee's misconduct before the firing, but it might be unclear whether
that information reached the supervisor who made the firing decision.
Sometimes employers will try to "beef it up" so that the misconduct can
become the legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the decision-which
would preclude liability altogether, rather than simply limit damages.'45
Plaintiffs' attorneys who regularly take employment discrimination
claims generally use some form of an early client screening process.'4 6
Lawyers report that they take fewer than five percent of the clients who

142. Interview with Denver management attorney (Apr. 2007).
143. Interview with Boston management attorney (May 2007); interview with Denver
management attorney (Apr. 2007).
144. Interview with Denver management attorney (Apr. 2007).
145. Id. A New York attorney described similar blurring in his practice experience and said
that he will generally "make every legitimate effort to cast the evidence as the nondiscriminatory reason for the decision, rather than falling back on after-acquired evidence."
Interview with New York management attorney (June 2007).
146. Interview with New York plaintiffs' attorney (Feb. 2007).
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initially approach them with potential claims. 4 7 The screening process that

precedes taking on a client could involve, for example, asking what the
employer might say about the employee,148 if there are co-workers who
would be willing to discuss the potential plaintiffs reputation, 14 9 if there is

anything missing or inaccurate on the potential plaintiffs resume, 50 or if
the plaintiff has any past criminal convictions. 5 The screening is focused

on the merits of the case, and also on the plaintiffs credibility generally.'52
These screening interviews will eliminate potential clients for many
reasons; one is the client's admission of some serious misconduct that, in
the lawyer's judgment, is likely to undermine her credibility as a plaintiff.
In some instances the misconduct is of the sort that might support a

successful after-acquired evidence defense.153 Even if the lawyer does not
decline representation, several of the attorneys interviewed had had at least

one client decide on her own not to pursue a case because
some past
5 4

misconduct might come to light in the course of the litigation.

Although most plaintiffs' lawyers report that evidence of misconduct
comes up during the client screening process, not all potential after-acquired
evidence will lead lawyers to turn a client away. In some cases, the reported

misconduct will be minor enough that the plaintiffs lawyer believes it will
not support the defense. Even in those cases, some lawyers report that they
debate whether to take the case, given that the after-acquired evidence
arguments are likely to "sidetrack" or "derail" the litigation off of the

employer's discriminatory actions and onto the question of whether the
employee would have been fired even absent the discrimination.'55 Several
plaintiffs' lawyers noted that the place to fight about this kind of issue is
during discovery; you have to "pick your battles carefully and not allow the
employer to probe into areas that are completely irrelevant.' 5 6 As one
147. Interview with Chicago plaintiffs' attorney (Feb. 2007); interview with Denver
plaintiffs' attorney (Feb. 2007); interview with New York plaintiffs' attorney (Feb. 2007).
148. One lawyer reported that she always asks a potential client, "What is the first thing
people would say about you?" Interview with California plaintiffs' attorney (Apr. 2007).
149. Interview with California plaintiffs' attorney (Mar. 2007).
150. Interview with New York plaintiffs' attorney (Feb. 2007).
151. Interview with Minneapolis plaintiffs' attorney (Feb. 2007).
152. Interview with California plaintiffs' attorney (Mar. 2007).
153. Interview with Denver plaintiffs' attorney (Apr. 2007); interview with New York
plaintiffs' attorney (Feb. 2007).
154. Interview with New York plaintiffs' attorney (Feb. 2007).
155. Interview with Los Angeles plaintiffs' attorney (Apr. 2007); interview with
Minneapolis plaintiffs' attorney (Feb. 2007).
156. Interview with Colorado plaintiffs' attorney (Apr. 2007); see also McNamara &
James, supra note 117, at 31 (suggesting that plaintiffs' lawyers conduct careful screening
interviews and discovery in order to prepare themselves for the possible assertion of the afteracquired evidence defense).
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plaintiffs' attorney with more than twenty years of experience litigating
employment discrimination claims put it:
Employers . . . right away start trying to find anything and

everything they can about the employee. Generally they will find
something if they look hard enough. A recent common one is
personal email use. People use email at work, and they often do it
in violation of company policy against doing personal email. So
all an employer has to do is get the IT person to give them a list of
all emails ever sent. Then the employer can derail the discussion
about discrimination57and start talking about whether company
policy was violated.1
Of course, when an employer claims the employee would have been
fired for something like personal email use, the employee's litigation
strategy is clear and, likely, will be successful: demand records of whether
any other employees ever were terminated for the same misconduct; ask
employees at depositions whether they ever sent personal emails; and take
the deposition of an IT staff member to prove how common personal emails
are. But beating back the employer's argument comes at a real cost in
dollars (attorney time plus thousands of dollars of out-of-pocket costs for
transcribed depositions) and time--especially given the presumptive limit
of ten seven-hour depositions,"' which means time and money spent
discussing personal emails diminishes the resources available to litigate the
discrimination claims. Thus, even a relatively weak after-acquired evidence
defense can, by imposing costs and distractions, do significant harm to the
plaintiff s ability to litigate her allegations of discrimination.
Some plaintiffs' lawyers report that "employers try to push the envelope"
in order to get broader discovery.'59 The response to that concern from
defendants' attorneys is generally that the defense permits broad discovery,
and that employment discrimination claims even without the defense are
going to lead to a lot of discovery into the plaintiff's background and
conduct. Attorneys who work with employers say that they do structure
their discovery requests with an eye to discovering information that could
support an after-acquired evidence defense. The availability of the defense
makes discovery into a plaintiffs background essential. As one lawyer
explained, that kind of discovery may be a fishing expedition, but he "ha[s]
a fishing license."' 6 °

157.
158.
159.
160.

Interview with Los Angeles plaintiffs' attorney (Apr. 2007).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 30.
Interview with Chicago plaintiffs' attorney (Feb. 2007).
Interview with California management attorney (Mar. 2007).
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Both plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers report that after-acquired
evidence increases the chances that a case will settle and that it will settle at
a lower value than it would have absent the after-acquired evidence. 6 ' A
number of plaintiffs' lawyers said that they had turned down or
recommended early settlement on cases that involved serious instances of
discrimination, but in which the employee's own conduct seemed likely to
162
interfere with successful litigation.
These accounts suggest that the small number of reported opinions of
after-acquired evidence is, at least in part, explained by the fact that a
plaintiff with misconduct in her record that might support the defense is
unlikely to proceed very far in litigation. Some certainly take the view that
this is entirely appropriate-one defendant's lawyer interviewed, for
example, said the presence of after-acquired evidence of misconduct should
"absolutely" affect a plaintiffs right to remedies, as it "shows the plaintiff
is dishonest."'' 63 Indeed, as one attorney put it, "an employee should be
dissuaded from bringing suit if their conduct was such that they would have
been fired."' 164 But it may also be seen as raising a problem with the
defense-if the possibility of discovery of after-acquired evidence is
chilling legitimate claims of discrimination, is it interfering with full
enforcement of laws prohibiting discrimination? In McKennon, the Court
emphasized the public value of litigating these private discrimination suits,
explaining:
The disclosure through litigation of incidents or practices that
violate national policies respecting nondiscrimination in the work
force is itself important, for the occurrence of violations may
disclose patterns of noncompliance ... which can be of industry-

wide significance. The efficacy of its enforcement mechanisms
becomes one measure of the success of the Act.165
If the after-acquired evidence defense is interfering with these important
public goals, should courts reconsider the defense?
161. One management attorney said that after-acquired evidence can actually be a "doubleedged sword" in the settlement context: "It may have been the case that the employer was ready
to settle, but now because of AAE, they won't." Interview with Los Angeles management
attorney (Mar. 2007).
162. Interview with California plaintiffs' attorney (Apr. 2007); interview with Denver
plaintiffs' attorney (Apr. 2007); interview with Chicago plaintiffs' attorney (Feb. 2007).
163. Interview with California management attorney (Mar. 2007).
164. Interview with Boston management attorney (May 2007). Another lawyer said that
"after-acquired evidence is sometimes used to intimidate the employee, but if there is a
legitimate reason for the discovery, then why not?" Interview with California management
attorney (Mar. 2007).
165. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1995).
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WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE

The after-acquired evidence defense is a bad idea. It has a number of
important negative consequences in employment discrimination litigation
that are not sufficiently deterred by the check of judicial discretion. But the
doctrine is not going anywhere. The after-acquired evidence defense has
staying power, derived in part from skepticism about employment
discrimination plaintiffs more generally and in part from assumptions about
the purposes of remedies in discrimination lawsuits. While the doctrine is
thus certain to remain a fixture of discrimination litigation, its effects could
be moderated by providing plaintiffs a more powerful mechanism for
challenging frivolous assertions of the defense. The prohibition on
retaliation against a discrimination claimant could offer plaintiffs that tool,
particularly in light of the Supreme Court's expansive 2006 interpretation
of
166
the doctrine in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White.
A.

Why the Doctrine Should (but Won't) Be Abolished

The most significant problem with after-acquired evidence is that the
doctrine has a chilling effect on full enforcement of laws prohibiting
discrimination in employment. The doctrine legitimizes expansive
investigation into a plaintiffs background and has been used by defendants
to push the boundaries of discovery. As at least one court has recognized,
[t]he prospect of a defendant's thorough inquiry into the details of
a plaintiff's pre- and post-hiring conduct . . . may chill the
enthusiasm and frequency with which employment discrimination

claims are pursued, even in cases where the victim of
discrimination has nothing to hide, let alone
cases where the
blameless. 167

potential plaintiff is not entirely

The doctrine raises the fear in potential civil rights plaintiffs that their
character and conduct well beyond the boundaries of their job performance
will be put on trial if they choose to pursue a claim. After-acquired evidence
thus alters the assessment that both plaintiffs and their lawyers will make in
evaluating whether to challenge discriminatory employment decisions. It
does so not based on the seriousness of the employer's bad conduct, but on
the seriousness of the employee's generally unrelated misconduct. The idea
that "good" people deserve remedies against discrimination and "bad"

166. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
167. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1236 (3d Cir. 1994).
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people do not should not be an element of the nation's antidiscrimination
policy.
The Supreme Court's assumption that courts could exercise their
discretion in controlling litigation to deter abuses of the doctrine has not
been a sufficient response to these concerns. First, much of the impact of
the doctrine is felt before courts ever get involved in a dispute. The attorney
interviews described in Part III suggest that after-acquired evidence plays a
role in screening plaintiffs out of representation as well as in early
settlement of cases. Second, the reported cases suggest that courts very
rarely use their discretion to impose limits on assertions of the defense.
Instead, defendants are given a fair amount of leeway in asserting the
defense, even in cases where either their policies or the employee's alleged
misconduct are ambiguous.
Moreover, the doctrine shifts the conversation in civil rights litigation
away from the hard job of assessing whether the particular employer
conduct was the kind of discriminatory action the law condemns as illegal.
As commentators noted about the earliest after-acquired evidence cases,
"[t]hose courts granting judgment to the defendant do so without resolving
the discrimination claim. Their discussion of the employer's conduct
generally is limited to a conclusory recitation of the alleged discrimination;
the opinions then proceed to describe with great specificity the misconduct
with which the plaintiff is charged.' ' 168 The resulting 69"rhetorical imbalance"
masks what is truly important in discrimination law.1
In this respect, the after-acquired evidence doctrine fits into a more
general, and troubling, trend in discrimination law. Courts are spending so
much time on procedural requirements and other matters of litigation
strategy in these civil rights cases that they are avoiding the core questions
of discrimination that lay at the heart of the law. This pattern appears also in
many of the cases the Supreme Court has considered in recent years. In the
past five Terms, for example, the Court has considered nineteen federal
employment discrimination cases. Eight of these cases have considered
matters such as the timeliness of filing administrative complaints; 7 ' what
constitutes a charge for EEOC exhaustion purposes;' 7' whether the
minimum number of employees required for coverage is a jurisdictional
bar;.. and similar procedural questions that skirt the issues central to the
purposes of the discrimination laws. Continuing this pattern, the Court has
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

White & Brussack, supra note 19, at 51.
Id.at 51-52.
See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
See, e.g., Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002).
See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
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granted certiorari in the October 2007 Term on another case raising a
question entirely about EEOC filing procedures. 73 These can certainly be
important questions. But, like debates about whether an employee's
misconduct would have been sufficient for termination had the employer
been aware of it at the time, they do not get us any closer to understanding
when and why discrimination continues to be such a pervasive workplace
problem. Nor do they confront the extremely difficult questions of what
employer conduct is in fact illegal discrimination.
The trouble with after-acquired evidence, then, is that it turns the focus
away from discrimination and deters plaintiffs based on matters entirely
separate from the seriousness of their civil rights claims. Rather than aiding
in the process of separating valid claims of discrimination from frivolous
claims, the doctrine sorts claims by reference to the plaintiffs' past conduct.
As courts, litigators, and policymakers struggle to separate the wheat from
the chaff of discrimination claims, the after-acquired evidence doctrine
distracts from that effort.
Despite these significant negative consequences, the after-acquired
evidence doctrine is not going to disappear anytime soon. The justification
for the defense is tied directly to core assumptions about employment
discrimination remedies. When the Supreme Court adopted the defense, it
explained that the employee's misconduct could not be ignored in assessing
damages because courts had to acknowledge the legitimate business
interests of employers not to reinstate employees who had engaged in
workplace misconduct.174 The Court's underlying assumption was that,
absent the misconduct, reinstatement would be the appropriate remedy.
And, in fact, it is a bedrock principle of discrimination law that
reinstatement is the preferred remedy.1 75 Front pay is described as simply a

173. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 440 F.3d 558 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127
S. Ct. 2914 (2007). The 2007-2008 Term at the Supreme Court included a more significant
number of core substantive employment discrimination questions than the previous terms. The
Court also considered the availability of retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, CBOCS
West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 30 (2007) (mem.), and for federal employees under the
ADEA, Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 29 (2007) (mem.), and whether "me too" evidence
could be introduced in age discrimination cases, Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 127
S. Ct. 2937 (2007) (mem.). The Court was also scheduled to consider whether an employee who
becomes unable to perform her current job responsibilities is entitled to preference for
alternative jobs, Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 742 (2007) (mem.), but the Court
dismissed the certiorari petition in January 2008, Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07-480,
2008 WL 114946, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2008).
174. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 361 (1995).
175. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 n.12 (1975).
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substitute for reinstatement, available only in exceptional cases.176 Once
front pay is tied to reinstatement, then the exclusion of reinstatement due to
employee misconduct leads logically to the conclusion that front pay, too,
should be excluded as a remedy. The doctrine thus seems "only fair." If
reinstatement were not the preferred remedy for discrimination, then the
rationale for the after-acquired evidence doctrine would be less clear. And,
in fact, the notion that reinstatement is the preferred remedy is nothing but a
legal fiction. Neither the employee nor the employer, at the end of litigation
over employment discrimination "prefers" reinstatement, and courts rarely
require it.'77 Because this assumption is a cornerstone in the rationale for the
after-acquired evidence defense, pulling it apart would undercut the
legitimacy of the defense and might prompt courts and commentators to
agree that the doctrine's negative consequences far outweigh any real
benefits. As a practical matter, though, unraveling these core remedial
assumptions would require a judicial activism that seems unlikely at best.
For the time, then, the after-acquired evidence doctrine is almost certainly
here to stay.
B.

A More Modest Proposal:Recognizing the Defense as Retaliation

An alternative to abolishing the doctrine might be to give plaintiffs a tool
with similar power to equalize the litigation playing field. From nearly its
first appearance in employment discrimination litigation, the after-acquired
evidence doctrine has been criticized by a small number of courts as bearing
"the stain of retaliation."' 78 Why, then, couldn't assertion of the afteracquired evidence defense, at least in some circumstances, constitute
impermissible retaliatory conduct under federal discrimination laws?
Evidence offered in Parts II and III, both about how courts treat afteracquired evidence claims and about the influence of the doctrine on
litigation in its early stages, suggests that the after-acquired evidence
doctrine may sometimes have precisely the chilling effect that the antiretaliation provisions of federal law were designed to prevent. 179 While no
176. See, e.g., Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Note, The FrontPay Niche: Reinstatement's Alter
Ego Is EquitableRelieffor Sex Discrimination Victims, 88 GEO. L.J. 299, 315 (2000).
177. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 647, 651 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
178. See, e.g., Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1238 n.31 (3d Cir.
1994); Rivera, 204 F.R.D. at 650.
179. The anti-retaliation provisions are widely recognized as essential to securing the
primary antidiscrimination objectives "by preventing an employer from interfering (through
retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the [law's] basic
guarantees." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412 (2006); see also
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (stating that the "primary purpose" of the
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case has yet permitted a plaintiff to bring a claim of retaliation against an
employer for asserting the defense, closely analogous claims have been
permitted and discussion about the relationship between the search for afteracquired evidence and retaliation persists. And yet the notion of treating this
litigation strategy as actionable retaliatory conduct seems immediately
problematic. This Section will consider the merits of permitting plaintiffs to
challenge some or all assertions of the after-acquired evidence defense as
impermissible retaliation. After a brief explanation of the Supreme Court's
decision in Burlington Northern and its clarification of the retaliation
standard, it will explore how courts have treated retaliation claims premised
on the impermissible use of litigation strategy and what this treatment might
mean for the relationship between retaliation and after-acquired evidence.
1.

The Burlington Northern Retaliation Standard

Title VII's prohibition on retaliation provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice . . . or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an
180
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [the statute].
Until 2006, the meaning of this provision was the subject of considerable
debate, both as to what conduct was sufficiently adverse to constitute
discrimination and as to whether that challenged conduct had to occur on
the job to violate the statutes.1"8' The Supreme Court provided some
resolution to these debates in Burlington Northern, taking a generally
expansive approach to claims of retaliation.
The circuit split that the Burlington Northern Court confronted over the
scope and meaning of the retaliation provision of Title VII had several
vying camps. Some circuits required that the allegedly retaliatory conduct
had to affect the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment, essentially
applying the same standard for retaliation that they applied for the
underlying prohibition on discrimination;'
in some circuits, this
employment-related requirement was applied even more strictly to include
anti-retaliation provision is "[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms").
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). The ADEA and ADA contain similar anti-retaliation

provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2000).
181. Burlington N., 126 S. Ct. at 2410.
182. See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001).
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only "ultimate employment decisions" such as firing or demotion." 3 Other
circuits did not require that the employer's conduct be related to
employment in order to constitute prohibited retaliation. 8 4 These courts
concluded that any "adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive
and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging
in protected activity" would meet the statutory requirement.' 8 5 Yet a third
group took a kind of middle ground, applying the retaliation provision to
conduct on and off the job, but requiring the plaintiff to show that the
"employer's challenged action would have been material to a reasonable
employee.' 86 In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court overruled the
stricter standards applied in many circuits, holding that the provision "does
not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to
employment or occur at the workplace" but that it does cover only those
actions that would meet an objective standard of "materially adverse."' 87
In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed that prohibiting only
retaliation occurring on the job would not achieve the goal of preventing
interference with an employee's exercise of civil rights, because "[a]n
employer can effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions not
directly related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the
workplace."' 88 A retaliation claim, the Court held, can therefore apply to
any "employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a
reasonable employee or applicant"-in other words, actions that are
"harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."' 89 The facts of the
Burlington Northern case itself involved on-the-job retaliatory conduct, 9 °
and so the Court, while holding that challenged conduct could occur on or
off the job, did not elaborate on what kinds of nonemployment actions
might support claims of retaliation.
In addition to endorsing retaliation claims for employer conduct that
occurs outside the workplace, the Burlington Northern opinion further
183. See, e.g., Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997); Mattem
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997).
184. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000).
185. Id.
186. Washington v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005).
187. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006).
188. Id. at 2412.
189. Id. at 2409.
190. Id. Sheila White's claim of retaliation challenged her employer's reassignment of
certain job duties and her suspension without pay pending an investigation for misconduct,
which she alleged had been trumped up to punish her for challenging sex discrimination on the
job. Id.
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expanded the potential for retaliation claims with its definition of the kinds
of employer conduct that might constitute materially adverse action. In
adopting the "materially adverse" standard, the Court sought to "screen out
trivial conduct while effectively capturing those acts that are likely to
dissuade employees from complaining or assisting in complaints about
discrimination."' 91 And yet the examples the Court gave-suggesting that
changing an employee's schedule or excluding her from a weekly training
lunch will, in some contexts, support a retaliation claim' 92-leave ample
room for arguing that normally acceptable conduct may in particular
circumstances become illegal retaliatory action.
While the contours of the Court's retaliation standard will be further
defined by fact-specific application in the lower courts, there is no question
that it was received by courts and commentators as a "more expansive"
standard than had previously applied.193 In the nearly two years since the
Court's decision, the number of retaliation claims has increased, 94 and, as
one plaintiffs' lawyer explained, "if you can include any argument for
retaliation-which you usually can-then you do." 195 Most retaliation
claims still challenge employer conduct at work. But a number of cases,
both before Burlington Northern and in the time since the Court's decision,
have considered claims of retaliation based on actions taken in the
courtroom or otherwise in the litigation process. Could plaintiffs use such
arguments to combat defendants' use of the after-acquired evidence
defense?

191. Id. at 2416.
192. Id. at 2415.

193. King v. Enter. Leasing Co. of DFW, No. 3:05-CV-0026-D, 2007 WL 2005541, at *14
(N.D. Tex. July 11, 2007); see also Hilt v. Nicholson, No. 3:05-0371, 2007 WL 1577701, at *6
(M.D. Tenn. May 31, 2007) (referring to the Court's "expansive standard"); Lisa M. Durham
Taylor, Adding Subjective Fuel to the Vague-Standard Fire: A Proposalfor Congressional

Intervention After Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 533, 598 (2007); Erwin Chemerinsky, Workers Win in Retaliation Case, TRIAL, Jan.
2007, at 58, 59 (describing the standard as broader than had previously been applied).
194. See Peter M. Panken, Retaliation Update: The New Vogue in Employment Litigation:
Don't Get Mad, Don't Get Even, Just Be Savvy, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, Feb. 2007, at

317-18 ("The retaliation cause of action becomes an add-on to almost every discrimination
complaint."); Paul I. Weiner & Joshua L. Weiner, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Impacting
on Title VII and § 1981 Jurisprudence,in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

2007, at 35, 40-42 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 759, 2007).
195. Interview with Denver plaintiffs' attorney (May 2007).
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Other Litigation Conduct as Retaliation

Even before Burlington Northern, numerous courts had recognized that

"'a lawsuit ... may be used by an employer as a powerful instrument of

coercion or retaliation' and that such suits can create a 'chilling effect' on
' While some circuits had rejected
the pursuit of discrimination claims."196
this type of claim because the challenged conduct was not employment
related'97-a rationale now abrogated by Burlington Northern-many had
concluded that malicious prosecution could constitute retaliatory action. In
a case cited approvingly in Burlington Northern, for example, the Tenth
Circuit held that a plaintiff had established a prima facie case of retaliation
where he demonstrated that, following his filing of an EEOC complaint, his
employer encouraged a co-worker to report an alleged forgery to the district
attorney's office, prompting the pursuit of criminal charges against the
plaintiff.98 In another case, a court found actionable retaliation when an
employer filed a civil defamation suit in response to a former employee's
filing of an EEOC sex discrimination charge. 9 9 And, in a suit brought under
the ADA and the ADEA, the defendant's decision to appeal a state award of
unemployment benefits to a former employee following his filing of an
EEOC claim was found to support a cause of action for retaliation."0 As the
court in that case explained, "[p]ublic policy strongly dictates against
allowing employers to bring groundless litigation in retaliation for an
employee's exercise of protected rights.""'' These decisions have
appropriately recognized that the threats posed by a defendant employer's
aggressive litigation can deter plaintiffs from pursuing claims of
196. EEOC v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 756, 758 (N.D. Ohio 1999)
(quoting Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 740-41 (1983)); see also Walsh v.
Irvin Stem's Costumes, No. 05-2515, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57398, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15,
2006); Ishkhanian v. Forrester Clinic S.C., No. 02 C 9339, 2003 WL 21479072, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
June 25, 2003); Gill v. Rinker Materials Corp., No. 3:02-CV-13, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2986,
at *11-12 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 24, 2003); Shafer v. Dallas County Hosp. Dist., Co. CA 3-96-CV1580-R, 1997 WL 667933, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 1997); Cozzi v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers,
Inc., No. 96 C 7228, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7979, at *8-10 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 1997); Harmar v.
United Airlines, Inc., No. 95 C 7665, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5346, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17,
1996) ("[T]he filing of lawsuits, not in good faith and instead motivated by retaliation, can be a
basis for a retaliation claim under Title VII.").
197. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531-33 (5th Cir.
2003).
198. Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Beckham v.
Grand Affair of N.C., Inc., 671 F. Supp. 415, 419-20 (W.D.N.C. 1987) (charging a former
employee with criminal trespass after she had filed an EEOC complaint could constitute
retaliation).
199. EEOC v. Va. Carolina Veneer Corp., 495 F. Supp. 775, 778 (W.D. Va. 1980).
200. Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1230-31 (D.N.M. 2001).
201. Id. at 1231.
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discrimination and thus interfere with the full enforcement of federal
discrimination laws.
Other courts have, however, sounded a note of caution about retaliation
claims premised on litigation conduct. The concern raised in these decisions
is that a defendant is entitled to employ the procedural and substantive tools
offered by the civil litigation system," 2 and that the best way to ensure these
tools are not abused is for courts to exercise their authority to monitor and
control litigation conduct.2"3 Even these courts have not tended to exclude
litigation conduct per se from the scope of retaliation, but they have
emphasized that "it will be the rare case in which
conduct occurring within
21 4
retaliation.
constitutes
litigation
the scope of
Within the range of litigation conduct that has been considered
potentially retaliatory, the circumstance that has arisen most frequently has
been the defendant's filing of a counterclaim in response to a discrimination
suit.205 In many cases, courts have allowed plaintiffs to amend their
complaints to add claims of retaliation after the defendant files a
counterclaim.20 6 Like malicious prosecution or appeal of an award of
unemployment benefits, the filing of a counterclaim can have a dramatic
impact on the plaintiffs sense of security in exercising her rights under the
discrimination laws. As one court explained:
If the defendant is permitted wide latitude in asserting
counterclaims, it ups the ante considerably for the plaintiff and
makes prosecution of the case more difficult. Moreover, such
latitude would permit an employer to send to its other employees
an implicit message that says "If you sue me, I'll sue you back,

202. Cf BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 533-37 (2002).
203. See, e.g., Glass v. IDS Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1029, 1061 n.53 (D. Minn. 1991)
("[T]he anti-retaliation provisions of the ADEA and Title VII are designed principally to deal
with retaliatory conduct that occurs outside the judicial system ....

Once a lawsuit has been

filed, courts have the tools to deal with counterclaims that are truly retaliatory or made in bad
faith.").
204. Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d 1070, 1075 (7th Cir. 1998); see also EEOC v. R.J.
Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 657 (5th Cir. 1999); Harper v. Realmark Corp., No. 4:04-cv-0040DFH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15673, at *9 (S.D. Ind. July 29, 2004); EEOC v. K & J Mgmt.,
Inc., No. 99 C 8116, 2000 WL 34248366, at *3 (N.D. Il. June 8, 2000).
205. See, e.g., Gill v. Rinker Materials Corp., No. 3:02-CV-13, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2986, at *15-16 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 24, 2003); Gliatta v. Tectum, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d. 992, 1009
(S.D. Ohio 2002); EEOC v. Va. Carolina Veneer Corp., 495 F. Supp. 775, 778 (W.D. Va.
1980).
206. See, e.g., Harper,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15673, at *2; Rosania v. Taco Bell of Am.,
Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 878, 882, 889 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Gliatta,211 F. Supp. 2d. at 1007.
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and it will cost you dearly." Needless to say, the message could
207
have a considerable chilling effect ....
Of course, courts debate the likelihood of these chilling effects of
defendant counterclaims in discrimination litigation. Some have concluded
that, because a counterclaim will not be brought until the plaintiff has
already filed a lawsuit, it cannot be said to have any chilling effect on the
filing of that suit and is therefore not within the scope of retaliation covered
by the statute. 208 These courts also argue that there is less risk of deterring
suits because the plaintiff would not be required to hire a lawyer to defend
against a counterclaim, as he will already have hired a lawyer to bring the
suit. 2°9 But plaintiffs' lawyers often are retained on a percentage
contingency fee, whereas work defending against claims usually is
performed for hourly rates (because there is no "percentage" to be obtained
from successfully defending against a claim); accordingly, as at least one
court has noted, plaintiffs' lawyers might exclude the defense of
counterclaims from their standard fee agreements, thus eliminating this
economic argument.210 Furthermore, the fact that a counterclaim will not
have deterred this particular plaintiff from this particular suit cannot
eliminate the possibility of a broader chilling effect that might dissuade
other potential plaintiffs or witnesses.
3.

The After-Acquired Evidence Defense as Retaliation

Given the number of cases that have recognized retaliation claims
premised on the assertion of a counterclaim by the defendant employer, it is
surprising that only one court has had occasion to consider the merits of a
claim of retaliation stemming from the assertion of the after-acquired
evidence defense. 21' This fact becomes even more surprising when one
considers that both enforcement guidance from the EEOC and a number of
judicial opinions have noted the retaliatory potential in assertion of the
207. Barlow v. Hester Indus., Inc., 479 S.E.2d 628, 638-39 (W. Va. 1996); see also Loren
Gesinsky, When Is It Retaliatory to Bring a Counterclaim?, NAT'L L.J., May 21, 2007, at S4, S4
("Such counterclaims put plaintiffs on the defensive and leave each side with potential loss.
Often the resulting rebalancing of risk increases the likelihood of early settlement.").
208. See, e.g., Neuffer v. York Corrugated Container Corp., No. 03 C 1658, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7299, at *4-5 (N.D. Il1. Apr. 28, 2004); EEOC v. K & J Mgmt., Inc., No. 99 C 8116,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8012, at *8-12 (N.D. 111. June 7, 2000).
209. SeeK &JMgmt., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8012, at *10.
210. See Harper v. Realmark Corp., No. 4:04-CV00040-DFH-WGH, 2004 WL 1795392, at
*5 (S.D. Ind. July 29, 2004).
211. See Harmar v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 95 C 7665, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5346, at
*2 (N.D. I1l. Apr. 17, 1996).
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defense. 2 ' Moreover, a substantial number of cases in which defendants are
asserting the defense have involved allegations that the plaintiff engaged in
resume or application fraud.2" 3 In these cases, it seems nearly certain that the
at-issue conduct would not have come to light if the plaintiff had not
asserted her statutory rights. And interviews with lawyers suggest that
potential plaintiffs are sometimes dissuaded from bringing claims at all
because of the possibility that evidence of misconduct will eviscerate their
potential damages and will be damaging in other ways as well.2" 4 All of
these factors support the argument that at least in some sets of
circumstances plaintiffs might have viable claims of retaliation for the
assertion of the after-acquired evidence defense.
Not long after the Supreme Court decided McKennon, the EEOC
published a detailed enforcement guideline, advising its field investigators
what the Commission felt they should be looking for in investigating
charges of discrimination.2"5 The enforcement guidance anticipated the
possibility that some number of cases might involve after-acquired evidence
that was obtained through a "retaliatory investigation, i.e., one initiated in
response to a complaint of discrimination in an attempt to uncover
derogatory information about the complaining party or discourage other
charges or opposition. ' 2 6 As an example of such a retaliatory investigation,
the EEOC offered this hypothetical:
CP files a charge alleging that he was discriminatorily denied a
promotion. R launches an extensive background investigation of
CP and learns that he falsified his application. . . . [T]he
Commission finds that R did not simply discover the information
in the course of investigating the charge, but purposefully sought
212. See infra notes 215-216 and accompanying text.
213. See supra Part II.
214. An interesting analogy to after-acquired evidence arose in the age discrimination suit
launched by the EEOC against the law firm Sidley Austin Brown & Wood. The Chicago-based
law firm was sued for allegedly forcing senior partners to retire in violation of federal law.
Anthony Lin, Some Sidley Partners Ask to be Dropped from EEOC Suit, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 9,
2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 131457371689. While the lawsuit initially
"focused widespread attention on firm retirement policies as well as the highly centralized
management structure of today's large firms," once discovery had commenced in earnest
"Sidley Austin and at least some of the partners who allegedly experienced age discrimination
are now concerned that attention is shifting to the personnel records of individual lawyers." Id.
In this instance, individual lawyers sought to be dropped from the case in order to avoid
inspection of their files. Id. Because the suit was an action by the EEOC, only the government
was actually a party to the case, so individual lawyers could not "opt out." The impulse to avoid
litigation in order to avoid being subject to personal attack is much the same in this context as in
assertion of the after-acquired evidence defense.
215. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, supra note 15.
216. Id. at III.A.
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derogatoryinformation about CP in retaliationfor his challenging
the failure to promote.... [Blecause the evidence of wrongdoing

was not simply unearthed during an investigation of CP's
complaint, but was deliberatelysought to retaliateagainst CP and
to discouragesimilar charges ...this is the kind of "extraordinary
equitable circumstance" that warrants extending backpay to the
date the complaint is resolved." 7
The EEOC guidance thus anticipates that some negative information

about a plaintiff will be "simply discover[ed]"2

8

without retaliatory motive,

while other information will be the result of retaliatory conduct by the
defendant. The Commission does not provide any further suggestion as to
how the one circumstance might be distinguished from the other.
Courts, too, have worried that evidence used to limit a plaintiffs
recovery that is discovered only because the plaintiff brought suit
challenging the defendant's illegal acts has "the stain of retaliation."2 9

Essentially, "after acquired evidence penalizes the wronged employee twice
because such 'evidence would not have been discovered had the employer
not discriminated against the employee [to begin with].""'2 2 Thus, even
while permitting discovery to proceed in support of the defense, one court
noted that it was "concerned that the overzealous pursuit of discovery
carries the potential for abuse and could subject the named plaintiffs to
retaliation."2 Another court, anticipating the possibility for retaliation
inherent in the after-acquired evidence doctrine, suggested that "the

calculated discovery of after-acquired evidence (as opposed to, for example,
its inadvertent or independent discovery)" might constitute actionable
retaliation. 2 In such circumstances, "although it is exceedingly unlikely
that any economic damages would flow therefrom, it may very well be that

217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. Id.
219. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 647, 650 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Mardell v.
Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1238 n.31 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Ajayi v. Aramark
Bus. Servs., Inc., No. 00 C 4403, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3361, at *6-10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4,
2004); Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 321-24 (D.N.J. 1993).
220. Rivera, 204 F.R.D. at 650 (quoting Massey, 828 F. Supp. at 321).
221. Serrano v. Cintas Corp., No. 04-40132, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12664, at *5 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 9, 2006); see also Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 02Civ.4791HBDFE, 2003
WL 115221, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2003) (limiting discovery that risked being harassing
and retaliatory); Perry v. Best Lock Corp., No. IP 98-C-0936-H/G, 1999 WL 33494858, at *2-4
(S.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 1991) (same); Bickham & Clark, supra note 117, at 18 ("Considering the
potential impact on the 'value' of a lawsuit, it is not uncommon for defense counsel to
aggressively pursue discovery that might reveal employee misconduct, including subsequent
employer records.").
222. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1238 n.31.
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any evidence so stained would have to be suppressed at the remedies stage
of the proceedings" except for limited purposes.2 23 Further, a finding of
retaliation, even without economic damages, can provide the plaintiff
equitable review, a modest award of emotional distress damages,224 and
perhaps a more sizeable award of attorney's fees as a "prevailing party.' 225
In spite of these long-standing suggestions that assertion of the defense
might support an allegation of retaliation, only one reported opinion has
directly considered such a retaliation claim. 226 In Harmarv. United Airlines,
Inc., a group of plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that the defendant's
assertion of the after-acquired evidence defense in a related suit violated the
ADEA's anti-retaliation provisions.227 In its very brief opinion, the court
granted United Airlines' motion to dismiss the retaliation claim. 228 The
court noted that filing a frivolous lawsuit could be retaliatory, but concluded
that "[p]resenting an affirmative defense, even a frivolous one, will not
support a retaliation claim., 229 The Harmar court took the view that any
retaliatory potential in the defense was diminished by the fact that the
plaintiff would already have hired a lawyer, and so would not incur
additional hardship or expense. 23 0 Further, the court noted that an
affirmative defense does not subject the plaintiff to any risk of owing
damages, and is therefore less likely to 23chill
claims than is the filing of a
1
plaintiff.
discrimination
a
lawsuit against
The Harmar opinion underestimates the potential of the after-acquired
evidence defense to chill the exercise of federal civil rights. In fact, an
employer's assertion of the defense and the extensive and intrusive
discovery that accompanies its assertion can certainly dissuade plaintiffs
223. Id.
224. But see DeRoche v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 848 N.E.2d 1197, 120203 (Mass. 2006) (holding that a finding of retaliation alone is insufficient to permit an inference
of emotional harm).
225. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000).
226. Harmar v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 95 C 7665, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5346, at *2-5
(N.D. 111.Apr. 17, 1996). The plaintiff in O 'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d
756 (9th Cir. 1996), made a slightly different argument. Mr. O'Day argued that his removal and
copying of sensitive corporate documents was itself protected activity under the ADEA's
retaliation provisions, and that the defendant could therefore not legally discharge him for
engaging in that conduct. Id. at 762-63. Because the defendant could not fire O'Day for his
document misappropriation, he argued, it could not constitute after-acquired evidence
supporting the defense. Id. at 762. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of
this argument. Id. at 763-64.
227. Harmar, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5346, at *1-2.
228. Id. at *5.
229. Id. at *3.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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with legitimate claims of discrimination from pursuing these claims. While
some of the evidence that might support the defense could come in as
impeachment testimony, the after-acquired evidence legitimates broad
discovery that might otherwise be found overly intrusive; the defense also
ensures that damaging information about the plaintiff will come into court
in spite of its prejudicial effect. 2 As such, the defense raises for a
reasonable employee real questions about whether protecting her civil rights
is worth the potential embarrassment and exposure. Further, the potential
for the after-acquired evidence defense may make it more difficult for a
plaintiff to find legal representation.233 Aggressive use of the defense may
not affect the ability of the plaintiff in the particular litigation to find a
lawyer, but it does send a message to other employees that if they press
their rights the consequences will be aggressive background investigation.234
The fact that the after-acquired evidence defense may have this chilling
effect is not alone sufficient reason to endorse retaliation claims based on
assertion of the defense. Once the defense has been recognized as a
legitimate litigation tool for defendants, separating its retaliatory use from
its appropriate use may be nearly impossible. Even commentators who were
very critical of the strongest version of the after-acquired evidence defense
in its early years took the view that "[t]here is nothing inherently
illegitimate about an employer's acquisition of such information through
pretrial discovery or through its own pretrial investigation. 2 35 Instead, those
considering the issue have generally concluded that "the risk that damaging
information may be discovered is one that a plaintiff assumes when
bringing an employment discrimination action. 2 36 Like bringing a
counterclaim, filing a lawsuit or any other otherwise permissible litigation
tactic, assertion of the after-acquired evidence defense is something that
clearly happens with no retaliatory motive quite regularly. And yet, there
are also suggestions in attorney interviews that assertion of the defense may
sometimes be frivolous, and that it may be used to push the boundaries of
discovery to a questionable degree or otherwise to intimidate plaintiffs. 37
The McKennon Court's answer to this possibility was to emphasize the
discretion available to district courts to "deter ... abuses" through awards
232. See supra Part III.B.
233. See supra Part III.C.
234. Cf Barlow v. Hester Indus., Inc., 479 S.E.2d 628, 638 (W. Va. 1996) (discussing this
potential in counterclaims).
235. White & Brussack, supra note 19, at 84.
236. Christine Neylon O'Brien, The Law of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment
Discrimination Cases: Clarification of the Employer's Burden, Remedial Guidance, and the
Enigma ofPost-TerminationMisconduct, 65 UMKC L. REv. 159, 163 (1996).
237. See supra Part III.C.
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of attorney's fees and exercise of their authority under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure."' A very small number of cases do show this kind of
judicial monitoring of the boundaries of appropriate conduct in discovery. 39
But the number of cases in which objections to broad discovery are
overruled, or in which there is simply no evidence that courts are
considering the need to impose limits, is much larger.240 Moreover, there is
not a single case in which a court has imposed Rule 11 sanctions for
inclusion of a frivolous after-acquired evidence defense. Even in cases
where the defense appears to be entirely unsupported by the evidence, the
worst that happens for the defendant is a denial of summary judgment on
the question.' This is not such a terrible outcome strategically for the
employer, as it keeps the topic of the employee's alleged misconduct central
in the continuing litigation.242
Recognizing the need to separate appropriate uses of the doctrine from
inappropriate use, courts and commentators have occasionally proposed
"fixes" to address the concern that after-acquired evidence doctrine may
allow the defendant to use the civil discovery process to intimidate and
potentially retaliate against plaintiffs. For example, a few courts have
applied a rule analogous to the "inevitable discovery" doctrine in criminal
law, concluding that the defendant should not be permitted to rely on
evidence that was uncovered exclusively as a result of litigation
discovery.243 This kind of fix would be an improvement on the Court's
McKennon doctrine, but a more direct approach-and more consistent with
the statutory language as well as the newly broad understanding of
retaliation-would be to recognize that, in some cases, plaintiffs may have
viable retaliation claims against defendants for asserting after-acquired
evidence.
238. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 363 (1995).
239. See supra Part II.B.
240. See supra Part II.B.

241. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
242. See supra Part II.B.2.
243. See, e.g., Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1240 (3d Cir. 1994);

Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 647, 651 (E.D. Cal. 2001) ("[D]efendants may engage in
independent investigation regarding plaintiffs' immigration status but may not ask plaintiffs
such questions directly. As noted by plaintiffs . . . such investigation should have been done at
the time of hiring, not post-discrimination. The defendant-employer is not placed in an adverse
position because but for the lawsuit the employer never would have had reason to pursue such
an inquiry." (citation omitted)); Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314,
324 (D.N.J. 1993); see also Zemelman, supra note 19, at 208 ("If an employer cannot show
with reasonable certainty a date that it would have discovered legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons to make the employment decision in question, the court should award the plaintiff full
backpay.").
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Of course, winning a claim of retaliation on the basis of the assertion of
this defense would not, and probably should not, be easy. But the difficulty
of assessing the appropriateness of the claim in any given case should not
be an excuse for avoiding it entirely. In the context of retaliation allegations
based on the filing of counterclaims, courts have generally found that the
plaintiff must make some showing that the employer was motivated by a
desire to retaliate, rather than by some legitimate litigation goal.244 This
same requirement is implicit in the EEOC guidance245 and is the appropriate
standard to apply to claims of retaliation based on assertion of afteracquired evidence. A plaintiff pursuing such a claim would have to show
that the defendant was seeking to punish her by asserting the defense, and
was not simply making all legitimate legal arguments. This burden might be
met, for example, by demonstrating that the defendant's allegation that the
plaintiffs misconduct was termination-worthy was frivolous based on the
employer's overall history. Proving this kind of intent would impose a
significant burden on plaintiffs. But because questions of motive are fact
questions, likely to go to the jury, the possibility of a retaliation claim is one
that a defendant would have to take seriously, and that might prompt some
care in assertion of the after-acquired evidence defense.
This kind of care is warranted. The analysis of after-acquired evidence
cases conducted in Part II of this Article suggests that many of the afteracquired evidence defenses asserted by employers are highly dubious.
Defendants lose summary judgment on after-acquired evidence twice as
often as they win it.246 Because courts do not generally strike the defense for
lack of evidence, a loss on summary judgment is as close as a court will
come to suggesting that the defense is unsupported. It seems likely, though,
that some assertions of the defense in which the court denied summary
judgment involved circumstances that would simply not support the defense
at all. Similarly, defendants' efforts to expand the doctrine-also reflected
in the case analysis in Part II-suggest that tendency to push the boundaries
of a doctrine that should in fact be carefully limited in civil rights litigation.
The interviews with practicing attorneys described in Part III
demonstrate, among other things, the impact that a legal doctrine can have
on the choices parties make in crafting their litigation strategies. The
existence of the after-acquired evidence doctrine, for example, deters some
plaintiffs and their lawyers from pursuing claims and encourages early
244. EEOC v. Seelye-Wright of South Haven, Inc., No 1:05-CV-677, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 73529, at *12-14 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 10, 2006); EEOC v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla.,
Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 756, 758 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
245. See supra Part IV.B.3.
246. See supra Part II.B.2.
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settlement. 47 One reason to consider seriously claims of retaliation based on
assertion of after-acquired evidence is that the threat of a charge of
retaliation might cause a more careful evaluation by defendants of the
appropriateness of the defense in a particular case.
V.

CONCLUSION

So what is really wrong with after-acquired evidence? The evidence
from the judicial opinions discussing the doctrine and interviews with
lawyers who confront it regularly suggest a number of problems. Most
significantly, the after-acquired evidence doctrine risks filtering out serious
instances of discrimination because it puts the plaintiff on trial or, as
importantly, because it raises that risk in the mind of the potential plaintiff
and her lawyer. Because the most-often used employee misconduct
supporting the defense is resume or application fraud that would not likely
have been discovered if the plaintiff had not filed a claim of discrimination,
the defense significantly alters the risks to the potential plaintiff of pursuing
her civil rights. The doctrine thus filters employment discrimination claims
not on the basis of whether the employer's conduct was illegal, but
effectively on the basis of the plaintiffs moral worth.24 8 Moreover, afteracquired evidence adds to a general tendency in discrimination cases today
to shift the focus from the seriousness of a defendant's discriminatory
conduct onto tangential questions in the litigation.
Ideally, the after-acquired evidence defense should be abandoned. Its
justification rests on assumptions about employment discrimination
remedies that are deeply flawed. A new conceptualization of remedies in
civil rights cases would abandon the doctrine. But such a broad rethinking
of remedies is unlikely to occur anytime soon. In the meantime, as long as
after-acquired evidence continues to be a damages-limiting defense for
employers who are found to have illegally discriminated, its use should be
carefully circumscribed. Lawyers assessing the potential value of litigation
should be able to count on vigorous judicial limitations on expansive
discovery and assessment of all equitable concerns in awarding damages.
247. See supra Part III.C.
248. On this point, the tone of the after-acquired evidence cases before and after McKennon
has remained quite similar, despite the Supreme Court's caution that the doctrine was not
supposed to express a judgment about the moral worth of the plaintiff. McKennon v. Nashville
Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 361 (1995); see also Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1233 (criticizing this
aspect of the doctrine and observing that, to the contrary, "[i]nstead of focusing on the
worthiness of the victim, the statutes exclusively and unambiguously fix on the employer's
motives"); Zemelman, supra note 19, at 199 (discussing early cases and noting that they
"framed the issue simply as whether a particular plaintiff deserves a remedy").
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But these instances of judicial discretion are in fact quite rare. Some
alternative protections should be available to plaintiff employees facing
frivolous assertions of the defense. The possibility that an assertion of the
defense designed to scare the plaintiff or other employees out of challenging
discrimination might subject the employer to claims of retaliation would
provide this kind of additional deterrence against the doctrine's misuse.

